AIR
UNIVERSITY
review

JULY-AUGUST 1972

AIR UNIVERSITY review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

the cover

In recent years the world has seen much question-
ing, challenging, and overthrowing of traditional
authority. In this issue, Dr. Curtis W. Tarr
replies to five questions frequently asked him
by young people; Brigadier General Daniel
("Chappie") James, Jr., fielding questions at
Air Command and Staff College, considers chal-
lenges from within and outside the military; and
Major General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF (Ret),
tells of insurgents and how to counter them.
Our cover reflects one aspect of the challenge.

THE OBLIGATION TO SERVE

Dr. Curtis W. Tarr

A POPULAR ballad promises us that "the times they are a-changin'."
All of us who work with young people today realize that to a large
extent this younger generation, to recall a phrase from Thoreau,
often hears and steps to the beat of a different drummer.

Old reasons no longer justify traditional action. Young people want us to think
anew before we act as of old. For that reason, their questions serve
to provoke us to do the mental exercise we should have gone through long ago.
Many officers and noncommissioned officers, forced
to do this thinking, have found that they arrive at a new rationale
to support what needs doing. At other times they have learned that tradition
no longer can be justified. This experience suggests a change that
benefits all of us, young and old alike.

During my two years as Director of Selective Service, I have met with
young people all over the world, on campuses and in communities
as well as on military posts, at sea, and in combat areas. I have been stimulated
by their thoughtful questions. I have also learned that a careful answer
may not satisfy their own mental reservations, but it will convince them that
I am willing to reason with them, something they expect few of my age to do.

Five questions have come up repeatedly in our conversations. My experience is that young Americans, whether they be in the service or in civilian life, all have some of the same doubts; they puzzle over many of the same issues. Sharing these questions and my replies with men and women of the Air Force who work with youth may prompt other original thoughts that will be helpful in setting aside the anxieties of rapidly changing times.

Why do we need armed forces?

How well I remember the bright young girl who asked this question. She was one of three hundred youth who came to our building in Washington to protest a continuing war. I shall not forget the idealism she expressed fully in her face or the sincerity with which she talked.

It is not sufficient for us to say that men have always fought wars. The weapons of terror created in this century and the manner in which rockets and jet planes have compressed distances make war all the less tolerable. We must look more deeply for a reason to maintain armed might than merely to rely on the traditions of the past.

Young people offer two views on this subject. First, they argue that the people of the world are rapidly learning to live in peace. The only real necessity, they allege, is for the United States forthrightly to disarm, since it is our nation that has generated most of the hostility anyway. They cite as evidences of progress the Berlin agreement of last year, the continuing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the nuclear test-ban treaty of the Kennedy years, or perhaps President Nixon's recent trip to China. We have made encouraging strides, these young people claim. Have we not practically reached the day when men can set war aside?

The other view about the prospect of peace is more cynical. But we should disarm anyway, some youth assert. If the world is moving toward nuclear suicide, then at least we should not contribute to it.

To answer these pleas for disarmament, let us first consider our relations with the Soviet Union, the world's other superpower. Our present difficulties with the Soviet Union are rooted in the last days of World War II, when Soviet satellite nations were established in Poland and Romania, contrary to the Yalta agreements, and a puppet state was created in East Germany in violation of the Potsdam declarations.[1] We have been suspicious of the U.S.S.R. ever since. Winston Churchill spoke for many when, in 1949, he judged that only the possession of the atomic bomb by the United States prevented a Red Army sweep to the English Channel.

It is evident to me that since 1945 the United States has impressed the Soviets best when we had ready a force to direct against them. For example, the Truman Doctrine in 1947 provided military and economic assistance to Greece and thereby thwarted a Soviet-inspired coup. The Berlin Airlift in the following year brought relief to that beleaguered city, persuading the Soviets to lift the blockade many months later. Blunt force and the threat of nuclear war caused the Soviets to withdraw their nuclear missiles from Cuba in the fall of 1962.

Conversely, the absence of force has invited Soviet domination. The U.S.S.R. moved swiftly in Eastern Europe after World War II, following the rapid demobilization of our military forces. In 1948 the Soviets inspired a coup in Czechoslovakia that prevented further expressions of freedom there. Even more militant was the suppression of Hungary in 1956, after that nation gave evidence of seeking independence from the Soviet Union

and the Eastern European bloc of nations. In August of 1968, several hundred thousand Soviet troops, together with the armored columns of the Red Army, moved into Czechoslovakia, again to suppress the desire for freedom from Soviet domination.

Apparently, the Soviet leaders fear the prospect of losing control over the people of the Soviet Union.[2] This control rests upon the proposition that Communism, led by the Soviets, inevitably will control the future of men everywhere. If that proposition proves to be a myth in the months and years ahead, then absolute control over the U.S.S.R. may become impossible. Only expanding Soviet domination will confirm the philosophy of the Kremlin's leaders.

Against this background, it appears to me that progress toward stable relations with the Soviet Union will come only when we and our Western allies negotiate from a position of reasonable strength. We want very much to negotiate, to work toward political arrangements that will encourage peace, but we must be realistic enough to seek to do this in the climate that best will insure success. Coexistence should not require a continuing reduction of American opportunities and encourage a world environment in which our domestic idealism cannot survive.

Let us consider China, also. The leaders in the People's Republic of China assume that the stronger nations are becoming weaker and the weaker ones are gaining strength. This process, of course, was somewhat inevitable following World War II when our nation emerged with such vast strength and resources from victory and our allies, who shared in the triumph, faced in common with our enemies the massive job of rebuilding torn and twisted nations. Relatively, our strength could only decline. But the Mainland Chinese see themselves as one of the weaker countries beginning to gain strength to match their population numbers. They seek to lead the smaller nations of the third world. In so doing

the Chinese Communists seem willing to join the world community, but with the understanding that they help shape that community, create its rules, and establish its new relationships. Obviously the new world they are willing to create would encourage their growing influence.[3] Whether it will be shaped to our advantage as well depends upon the degree to which we are strong enough to assert ourselves.

The Chinese Communists in the past have provoked conflict among their rivals, thus frustrating coalitions that might be formed against them. They have played upon internal strife, upon the tensions that develop among races, political groups, economic factions. To do so, they have trained guerrilla cadres for use wherever opportunity presented the chance to strike. These efforts seek out places of weakness rather than strength. They have been antagonistic to our national aspirations in the past, and they may be so in the years ahead. That will depend upon our continuing negotiations that now, thankfully, have begun.

Have we not practically reached the day when men can set war aside? Hopefully, we are making progress toward peace, toward the compromises that all nations must make to insure it. But we have a long distance yet to travel. Furthermore, it seems evident that our differences with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are so fundamental that we cannot expect rapid reconciliation. We must prepare for long years of the tension of coexistence, as time overcomes the sharp differences that separate the great nations. I see no evidence that a disarmed United States would encourage a just peace. There is considerable reason to believe that force helps to preserve peace, even though it comes as an uneasy blessing in today's world.

Does armed strength invite more mistakes like Vietnam?

One morning a bright, restless fellow from

an eastern state college came to my office with some friends to talk about the war. After we had considered many topics, he bluntly asked me this question: "Does armed strength invite more mistakes like Vietnam?"

As he did so, I remembered what a favorite undergraduate professor of mine had told me and my fellow students in the last lecture of the term: "Anger is obsolete." What a perceptive insight that is! It was worth the entire term to have that benediction to our work. Anger has no place in the relationships among civilized men, even though we often fall short of appropriate conduct. But if it is true among men, why is it not true that nations should avoid anger as well, particularly a national anger expressed in war? We cannot dodge from such a question.

We should turn to force only as a last resort. But there are some evils that to me are worse than the evil of war itself. As a final measure, I would agree to the use of force in some circumstances to preserve life, to insure the chance for freedom, to advance the quest for equality, to guarantee the opportunity to seek truth, and to establish and maintain the right to believe. These are old ideas, I know, but they are still vital today. We cannot always avoid armed conflict.

Vietnam presents a special case. A decade or so ago, there were many discussions about the power of the President. Most of the books on the subject emphasized that the President had gained so much authority that the other two branches of government had become inferior and effete.

Deriving from this attitude, a heavy reliance on Presidential prerogative invited the tragedy of Vietnam. Too few leaders actually understand what authority is. Does it come from God? Is it bestowed by elections? Can it be granted by the Constitution, the Congress, the courts, our laws?

Actually, authority comes to the leader from those who consent to do what he asks. Every time he gives an order, his authority

is confirmed by those who carry it out. People consent to the commands of their leader for numerous reasons. Doing what he orders may make a person feel better, or more righteous, or more law-abiding. Others may do so to follow tradition. Some fear the penalty of disobedience that may involve loss of freedom or even cause one's death. Many persons would not invite the enmity of those who disapprove of a refusal to follow orders. Most people probably obey because they realize that the state cannot exist unless they accept reasonable commands, or else they are indifferent to them and obey out of habit.

Yet, whenever a person finds that the reasons for consenting to an order are not sufficient to compel him to do so, the refusal of that person to comply undermines the authority of the leader. The more often that authority suffers by disobedience, the less influential will be the traditions, the public pressures, the power of fear, and all other factors that augment the willingness to consent.[4]

Let me offer an example. Suppose one morning I arrived at our building in downtown Washington and asked one of the young fellows there to jog out to my home four miles distant to pick up a briefcase that I had forgotten. If the man's response to the order were repeatable, he probably would mutter something like, "You must be kidding!" Rather quickly the story would circulate throughout the building, making it somewhat less likely that the next person would agree to a ridiculous order from the Director.

A similar renunciation has grown among the American people regarding the war in Vietnam. By 1968, American citizens had begun to withdraw their consent to the military campaign in Southeast Asia. The President had committed us to a course of action that the people would not support without deep reservations and questions. Many Americans simply refused to obey orders or laws that assisted the war effort.

An American President must maintain the

consent of the people for waging war by two means. First, he must be certain that there is overwhelming support for entry into war and the continuation of it. The nation faced difficulty both in 1812 and in the Mexican War because of marginal public support. Second, the President must make certain that the people understand the war aims of the nation. This was the problem of our Vietnam involvement: a relatively minor commitment grew into a major one without the American people understanding clearly what the President intended to accomplish. Accordingly we have faced serious difficulties as we attempt to withdraw our forces and still carry out the obligations we made with our military commitment.

One lesson from the Vietnam involvement seems quite clear to me. Presidential prerogative is limited by the willingness of the people to consent to the President's actions and support them, and that essential support can be gained only by a clear enunciation of the goals the nation seeks in the use of force.

We will avoid a Vietnam situation in the future by skillful use of the machinery of government as it should be used, not by unilateral disarmament. The President must have the opportunity for initiative, but it is quite clear that Congress and the courts must retain their independence of action. Together the branches of the government can gauge the will of the people, help to direct it, and seek to maintain support for national programs.

Why can't we have an all-volunteer force now?

Shortly after I became Director of Selective Service, I went to Indianapolis to talk with 700 high school youth. I met four groups, offering the students a chance to ask questions. The first question in each assembly was, "Why don't we rely on volunteers?" My response in turn was to ask these young people how many would volunteer if we had no draft. Not one raised his hand.

History seems to justify our use of volunteers. Except during time of war, we relied entirely upon enlistees to support our armed forces until after World War II. Obviously, we cannot rely too heavily on this precedent, since ocean barriers that isolated us until the twentieth century do little now to deter missiles, planes, or ships. Furthermore, the role of our nation has changed remarkably since the nineteenth century. But most of us would agree that in a free society we should rely on voluntary service rather than conscription whenever it is possible to do so.

Political leaders in this country have talked about the all-volunteer force for many years. To study that possibility, President Nixon appointed a commission of distinguished Americans in 1969, asking former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., to be the chairman. After a year of intensive study, the commission submitted its report, which recommended that a force of 2.5 million men could be maintained on a voluntary basis with a yearly budget increase of $3.2 billion for salaries and benefits. Members of the commission declared that the reserve forces should be able to maintain desired strength through voluntary arrangements, that civilian control of the military forces would not be reduced by dependence upon volunteers, and that the men entering the forces would not differ racially or in personal qualifications simply because they were volunteers attracted by somewhat higher monetary rewards.[5]

In September 1971, the Congress passed legislation authorizing a yearly increase in pay and benefits of $2.4 billion. When the President signed this bill, he promised that he would work toward the establishment of an all-volunteer force by 1 July 1973. Since then, the armed services have been working hard to achieve that goal.

But tough problems deter rapid progress. For example, the reserve and National Guard forces presently need 50,000 men to reach their authorized strengths. While some of the states report gains, reserve leaders elsewhere face rather discouraging prospects. Nor are

the active forces immune from difficulty. In January and February of this year, all of the forces together enlisted 6500 fewer men than they did in those two months of 1971. The Navy missed its recruitment goal for six months during late 1971 and early 1972. The numbers of true volunteers, who enlist without concern for the draft, have not increased greatly despite the considerable pay increases offered.

Furthermore, it appears that blacks are entering the armed forces in greater numbers under voluntary arrangements. A year or so ago, we relied no more heavily on blacks for our military forces than the black percentage of the youth population. Now the number of true volunteers among blacks seems to be about one-third higher than the population share, an indication of the lack of opportunities available to blacks in the job market. Additionally, I believe we are relying more heavily on Spanish-speaking youth as well. In other words, the all-volunteer force may be considerably more dependent on racial minorities than was the drafted force unless we can take corrective action to prevent this. Most of us, I suspect, have more confidence that equity prevails in our society if our armed forces represent a cross-section of the population.

Finally, the average mental capability of enlistees has been lower than that of a force that includes inductees. Perhaps some of this decline can be offset by improved training, better use of the men in higher mental categories, and a reorganization of jobs to make possible the accomplishment of technical work with less able people. But ultimately we must rely on increasingly complex technology in national defense, since it is only be doing so that we can utilize our national superiority in time of war. If we cannot recruit young men capable of using and maintaining highly sophisticated weapon systems, then we will lose the option of using the most highly efficient deterrent forces available to the nation.

This is not an argument against the feasibility of the all-volunteer force. It is merely an explanation of the difficulty we are encountering to establish that concept. Recruiters must be reoriented to look for young men with high mental qualifications. They must not depend heavily on minority persons to fill quotas. Society must encourage our youth to serve in the armed forces. The military services must be reorganized so that they utilize young men more effectively. All of these difficult tasks must be accomplished to some degree at least before we will attain the President's goal.

If the all-volunteer force is to represent a cross-section of American youth, then approximately one out of three high school graduates and college students who are qualified must enlist. Young men can judge how quickly we will attain the force we need by measuring their own commitments to serve in the armed forces. If a young man favors the adoption of an all-volunteer force so that he may avoid the burden of service, then he seeks an unfair advantage.

Why do I owe the government anything?

An Ivy League fellow at a fire base in Vietnam asked me this question. He was acute and direct. He had that interesting quality of trying to shock listeners into a response that otherwise they would not make.

He continued, "If this is a free country, why can't I be free, do my thing, obey the laws I want?" My guess is that he would have been happier if I had depended upon an emotional response rather than a reasoned one.

However, his question helped me recall my reading about the social contract, which I had first done as an undergraduate. I remembered the divine right of kings, a system under which the king spoke for God, and subjects thus were both morally and politically bound to obey. If the king ordered, subjects responded: the state had the power to insure

compliance. But eventually some bolder spokesmen for the people argued that the king sometimes spoke imperfectly for God. Clearly there was a necessity for curbs on an unjust king, particularly following oppression such as that in the Massacre of Saint Bartholomew in 1572.

Accordingly, the concept evolved of restraint imposed by natural and historic rights. During the English Civil War, rebels justified their conduct because the king had broken his contract with the people that rested on these rights.

Philosophers had to grapple with both the confusion and turmoil of a civil war, when people resisted the king's prerogative, and the necessity to contribute to the purposes of the state so that it might survive. Thomas Hobbes argued for the absolute state on the ground that order was the highest good that man could achieve. The way in which a man finds order is to give up his rights from the state of nature in exchange for the security of a government ruled absolutely by the king expressing his will. This would eliminate civil strife, insuring order through compliance of every man to the will of the state as set forth by the king.[6]

John Locke favored the rebels in the English Civil War, and consequently he sought to answer Hobbes with a justification for curbs on the power of the government. Locke argued that the state must be limited by the laws of nature, since the only necessity for the state was to interpret the law of nature that protected life, liberty, and property. If the agents of the state went beyond the law of nature, they must be resisted.[7] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in a similar justification for the social contract, saw that freedom could best be preserved if men obeyed laws established by the general will.[8] Yet, despite limitations that social contract proponents placed upon the power of the state, they admitted that men must agree to serve the state or else law and justice are not attainable.

Although the idea of the social contract had considerable influence upon our founding fathers, it is evident that the theory had obvious limitations. Man was never free in nature; societies, even in primitive surroundings, have always existed. And, as David Hume pointed out, examples when consent was given have been few and isolated.[9] Nevertheless, we can hardly discard the concept of service to the state that was part of the social contract simply because we reject as defective the mechanism by which Locke and Rousseau argued that man figuratively associated himself to a political society.

The Utilitarians also agreed that man had duties to society, even though they argued for strict curbs on the state. John Stuart Mill proposed that the individual's freedom of action should be nearly absolute, limited only by the compulsion necessary to insure the security of others. Yet he admitted specifically that the state can require one to give evidence in a court of justice, bear a fair share of the common defense, undertake a reasonable part of the work necessary to the interests of society, and perform individual acts such as saving a person's life or protecting another from attack.[10] Thus again we detect the underlying theme that government may require each of us to serve in some ways in order that society will be preserved.

I find similar logic in some contemporary thought. As an example, the theory of fairness argues that it is unfair for one to accept the benefits of a society and not to assume its burdens as well.[11]

I recognize that many young people have read a great deal about civil disobedience and are persuaded by the necessity for it. We recall how Antigone defied Creon in order to bury the body of her brother Polynices, protesting that Creon had defied the overriding laws of the gods.[12] Thoreau spent a night in the Concord jail for refusing to pay taxes to a government that tolerated slavery and waged a war with Mexico. Later, he stated defiantly

that we should be men first and subjects after.[13]

Martin Luther King, Jr., in our time, insisted that we must refuse to obey unjust laws. He said with poetic conviction that the "time always is ripe to do right . . . [to carve] a tunnel of hope through the dark mountain of disappointment."[14]

Surely no just society can refuse to permit dissent over apparent injustice. Thus we see many forms of protest in modern America. Even more, we as a people sometimes are swayed by that protest, when it strikes a chord of conscience or conviction that is ripe among us for expression.

But despite that, if we are to retain the goodness and justice underwritten by the state, then we must balance freedom and authority. I cannot see how anarchy will guarantee justice.[15] Neither am I sanguine that we can preserve a good state unless we are willing to serve it.

What reason is there to gamble upon the unknown and give up what we already have secured in America through centuries of striving and courageous sacrifice? We must improve our nation. But why should we consider destroying it unless we have assurance that what will take its place will improve the quality of justice and understanding? We still have reason to affirm that this nation is the last and best hope on earth.

Why don't we ask everyone to serve?

Frequently young people tell me that they would be willing to serve in some capacity if everyone did so. Just a few days ago one of our eastern newspapers reported a survey confirming public acceptance of universal service.

This idea has been expressed recently in two forms. After World War II, many public leaders argued for universal military training, a program in which every qualified American man would be required to spend some time in the armed forces. This historically has been a Swiss requirement. The concept never won acceptance in our Congress, partly because it became apparent that more young men were available than we required for defense of the country. Furthermore, short terms of service that utilize more people vastly complicate the training requirements of the armed forces and correspondingly reduce readiness.

More recently we have heard pleas for universal service, the concept that every young person would serve the nation in some capacity, here or abroad. Each year, about 3.5 million young men and women become eighteen years of age. Perhaps three million of them would be qualified for some kind of service, and thus the total force would be this size if we asked them to serve a year, or larger if the period of commitment were longer. The logistics to induct, train, clothe, house, and care for a force of three million youth would more than tax the capability of existing government departments and agencies. Perhaps only the military services could expand quickly enough to assume such a burden. Even more demanding would be the requirement for imaginative leadership to insure that these young people undertook worthwhile responsibilities appropriate to their skills. Nothing would destroy the idealism of American youth so completely as the requirement that they do work that either does not need doing or that they cannot hope to accomplish.

There are many activities in which young people can make important contributions. Before we ask them to undertake such activities, we must learn more about how success may be achieved. In at least three important areas youth could contribute to the nation's critical problems: education, improving the environment, and providing medical care. But it is worthwhile to consider the problems of utilizing young people in each.

No social activity is more crucial to the success of a democratic society than education. Likewise no activity helps an individual better to achieve the possibility of accomplishment

that is his. Regardless how we settle the issue of where our children should attend school, all of us probably can agree that we must improve the quality of the child's experience before he reaches the classroom.

We will not improve this experience until we make certain that many of our children receive better preparation for academic work. The public school concept assumes that all children will acquire a certain level of skill and accomplishment before they enroll. In many families, there is not sufficient resource of understanding or determination to justify this assumption. Young people might be able to give these children the preschool experience they need and otherwise would not have, such as building an adequate vocabulary while learning to converse, introducing them to reading, providing a social experience in which the child begins to learn about discipline and cooperation, and leading him through problems where he starts to explore the fundamentals of logic and reason upon which academic work must build.

Young people might very well make splendid contributions as tutors in the ghettoes or isolated communities or on reservations throughout the land; perhaps they could do so both with preschool children and with those who are encountering difficulties in the grades. But before we launch a vast experiment, we must know a great deal more about how to undertake the work that needs to be done. Experiments utilizing many approaches should begin before we expect a massive undertaking to produce the results we seek.

Similar problems exist with the improvement of the environment. Although the major challenges may continue to be technological, financial, and organizational, there are areas where young people can help. Youth can clear streams, shores, roadways, and parks, create new recreational areas, check erosion, restore forests, and plant grass and shrubs to provide food for wildlife. Furthermore, we need programs of public education to prevent

further pollution and encourage conservation. But it is not likely that such programs will prove sound until we undertake the experimentation necessary to separate the feasible techniques from those doomed to failure.

I expect to see great changes soon in the methods of providing medical service. It may be possible for us to reorganize health care to place more reliance on the untrained, particularly on young people who are intelligent but have not gone through the long academic programs to attain professional competence. Furthermore, we are aware that much which is needed, under any organization for providing service, increasingly has become unattractive to those who are available for work. Caring for people who are ill and often helpless will always involve hard physical work; sometimes it will be disagreeable. The quality of the service offered depends partly on the quality of concern on the part of those who offer it. Thus these are areas where idealistic young people could make an immense contribution as soon as we understand better how they might be utilized.

Because of these limitations, it seems to me quite apparent that we should be working now to expand and improve opportunities for voluntary service rather than to seek universal conscription. The new ACTION agency in Washington is planning and organizing voluntary programs at the present time. But even if the American people demanded it now, which they certainly do not, universal service would not be a viable program for many years.

THUS we find ourselves at a place in the nation's history when we must have armed forces, when we cannot provide all of the men we need through voluntary methods, and when we cannot utilize all of those who are available. Nevertheless, national security never has been more important than it is today. We will provide that security, and hope for a

peaceful future, if American youth will accept the obligation to serve.

No society can exist without requiring that its members serve in some ways, either through their work, their sacrifice, their loyalty, their tax payments, their hopes. We all owe something. Just as primitive tribes existed so that men collectively could hunt with crude weapons, modern societies still depend upon each of us in some way to do his part. All of us must be willing to serve as the nation needs us, or we shirk our responsibilities as citizens.

When too many fail to serve, then the nation cannot stand.

Despite changing times, some requirements remain. Society depends upon cooperation. We cooperate as citizens partly by accepting the obligation to serve when we are called.

Washington, D.C.

This article has been adapted from a presentation by Dr. Tarr at Rockford College, Rockford, Illinois, on 24 March 1972, while he was still the Director of Selective Service.

Notes

1. The best general introduction I have found to United States foreign policy is Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, Eighth Edition (New York, 1969).

2. Robert F. Byrnes, "Russia in Eastern Europe: Hegemony without Security," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 4, July 1971, 682–97.

3. For an interesting opinion on Chinese policy, see Michel Oksenberg, "The Strategies of Peking," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 50, No. 1, October 1971, 15–29.

4. See particularly Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1938), 161–84.

5. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, *Report* (Washington, 1970).

6. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*.

7. John Locke, *Second Treatise on Civil Government*.

8. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, Book I.

9. David Hume, *Of the Original Contract*.

10. John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, Chapter I.

11. John Rawls, "Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play," Sidney Hook, ed., *Law and Philosophy* (New York, 1964), 3–18.

12. Sophocles, *Antigone*.

13. Henry David Thoreau, "Civil Disobedience."

14. Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from Birmingham City Jail."

15. An interesting but unconvincing argument may be found in Robert Paul Wolff, *In Defense of Anarchism* (New York, 1970).

RAPPING WITH CHAPPIE

BRIGADIER GENERAL DANIEL JAMES, JR.

*Brigadier General Daniel ("Chappie")
James, Jr., USAF, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Public Affairs, recently addressed
the class of the Air Command and Staff
College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
Following his presentation, he invited
questions from the audience, and we are happy
to give our readers the benefit of excerpts
from that question-and-answer period.*

THE EDITOR

Moderator: Ladies and gentlemen, General James indicated that he would field your questions on the full range of subject material, including race relations, public information, budgeting—the whole nine yards.

General James: We in Public Affairs—that is part of my business, as you know—face a "firing squad" every day, made up of representatives of all the major news media in the country, in our pressure chamber up there in our press briefing room in the Pentagon. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Daniel Z. Henkin is our boss. Every day at eleven o'clock Jerry Friedheim, the principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, is the primary briefer of the press, with me as backup. Since at least one of the three of us usually accompanies the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense anytime he hits the road, I find myself facing the press many, many times. We are supposed to be able to address almost any question that comes up about the Department of Defense, so I want to give you the same freedom the press has. I might not have all the answers, or my answer or solution might not be the same as yours, but that is what it is all about, too.

Incidentally, I do not make a profession of being black. I do not have time for that, but since I have been black for some 51 years now, I do have a good deal of experience. So, anything you want to talk about, fire away.

Q: Sir, could you talk a little bit about some of the race problems that you saw while you were over in Vietnam and what is being done about them?

A: Yes. This is a point on which I have received a lot of criticism from the black side of the house—the Black Caucus, to be specific. But I believe it is really unfortunate that, in the last three years when the services have made more progress than in the whole history of the armed forces, we are getting so much flak on racism in the services. To the wild

charges of institutionalized racism in the services, I say, definitely, "Not so!" There are still individual practicing bigots in the services, and, to be sure, the services reflect the same problems that we have on Main Street, U.S.A.; but we have attacked them, and we have a systematic attack.

The Secretary of Defense has a real moral commitment to solving the problem, but we are never going to get it solved until all of you commanders have the same kind of moral commitment. By that I mean not just solving it because the regulations say there will be none of that but because in your hearts you know it is wrong. Now, we did not have enough of that moral attitude in Vietnam, or any of the other places. As a result, we have suffered accusations, the fraggings, and the hate spreaders. On the other hand, we have also been hurt by the guy who has been raising hell about everything from haircuts to the soul handshake—things one should not even bother about. Personally, I do not care how the troops shake hands, as long as they can fight, because that is what we were over there for.

Too often, however, when one of these incidents arises, the press is right there with every camera zeroed in and every mike on. It makes every newspaper in the world.

This kind of thing bothers the young black GI who is proudly out there leading his platoon through the jungle, destroying the enemy, and doing what he is supposed to do when it is necessary. So many of them come home with a stack of ribbons and their personal pride intact, but you seldom hear about them. Also, you do not hear about their white brothers who come along with them and respect them a lot more than they did any blacks before they went over and saw them perform. And maybe they saved each other's life along the way. It is happening every day just as it happened when we were in Korea together and as it happened when we were over Hanoi together.

That is what I talk about to young lads all over the country: that there is not all that much mutual hate over there between our personnel. It is true, however, that any hate is too much. But we get them right from the ghetto and from Main Street, U.S.A. Johnny White Man comes in with his prejudices, his fears, and his private hates. He is confronted

General James conducts a news conference in the Pentagon.

with the young black kid from the ghetto, and they go to Vietnam together still nursing a heartful of hurt and a fistful of hate. Too often they turn it on each other before they have a chance to find out that they do not hate each other after all, that it is not really necessary, and that we cannot afford it—which is more important. We have not solved it fully yet, but we are getting there.

As I said, we have a Secretary of Defense who is devoted to solving these problems. If we catch any practicing bigot, he is dead, professionally, in this service. We do not have any place for a commander who cannot be concerned about racism and have a commitment against it. Mr. Laird has stated there will be no more of that. And if we find them out, they will not command a latrine detail

in this service anymore, anywhere, I can promise you. That is going to help solve it.

Q: Sir, the percentage of black officers in the Air Force today is still very low. What programs are in progress to increase the number of black officers in the Air Force? And, more particularly, what programs are in progress to increase the number of black pilots who will eventually move on to command positions?

A: I just finished talking to one of the young lads who is part of one of the programs being carried out. Captain Griffin is a member of the staff of the Air University here, and he has been delegated to lead the planning and the effort that his command is making to enhance minority recruiting. Minority recruiting is a big thing in all of the services now, and we have made a lot of progress in this area.

There are several developments, however, that make it a little more difficult for us. You see, despite what the militants are saying, there has been a lot of progress made quietly on the "outside" because the incumbent President, too, is concerned about racial and minority affairs. The Equal Opportunity and Equal Employer programs have taken hold in a lot of places. As you may know, a large manufacturer almost lost a fighter contract recently because he had not complied with some of the rules. He has jolly well complied now. But, you see, this company and others are hiring a lot of brilliant young blacks, who are the same kind we want.

In the Air Force and the flying arms of the Navy and Marines, we must have the good guy. We cannot take just anybody, and we are not going to lower our standards to the street level. We have got to keep our standards high, but also we must make sure there is a vehicle for the young black and other minority members to be able to compete for these positions. And that is what we are doing.

Captain Griffin, for example, is going

around and speaking at many schools, both black and white—the predominantly black and the predominantly mixed—because it is a fact that the percentage of second lieutenant and first lieutenant blacks and other minorities is going down. The reason it is going down is that the opportunities for them outside the service—opportunities for them to get into medical school, law school, and other high-paying and respected career areas—have opened up recently. We in the Air Force are competing with those occupations now, and we must not give up. We have to go out there and point out our scholarship opportunities. We have some hard work to do.

Last week, we had some people from the Air Force Academy in Washington, and they were concerned about this problem. You see, the Air Force has said for so long, "Man, *we* didn't throw the brick—*we're* all right. See, we have Chappie James, a *general!*" But he is the only one. You know, my mother used to say there were two Negroes we could do without: the first one, and the only one. And I agree with her on her ideas of the first one to do this and the only one to do that. She said, "I'm looking forward to the day when so many of us will be doing so many noteworthy things that they will no longer be newsworthy." That is what we are approaching today.

But we are not going that way fast enough. The Navy has made much significant progress along this line in the past year, and the Army is moving ahead, too. The number of blacks in the doolie class at the Air Force Academy is about 25 this year, and the Academy has made a commitment to improve. The Navy's number in first-year class went up to 45, which was almost as many as they had in the whole Naval Academy last year.

Admiral Zumwalt explained on national TV that they got them because they went out and found them, recruited them. The Navy told them it needed them, and it offered them a $50,000-plus education in return for five

years of their lives. You don't find too many, no matter what color they are, who are going to turn that down. In fact, if someone is dumb enough to reject that offer, we probably could not use him anyway.

So we must go out and talk to them—we do not recruit just in the lily-white areas anymore. We go down to George Washington Carver High School, and we try to get that young black who has the ability but perhaps not the means. And we say, "We have an education here for you in the ROTC, or at the Air Force Academy, or at one of the other academies, if you want to go and can qualify. In return, here is what you have to do for us, which is really a part of your responsibility, anyway. And you can do it all at the same time, at substantial expense to the government." That is how we try to get them in.

We are also trying to do away with the problems within service units. One of our methods is to utilize or recognize councils. Some might say we have councils coming out the ears. The commander has more help now than he has ever had in his life. He has the Human Relations Council, the Equal Opportunity Council, and representatives of the other side. He has them all, and they are all advising him. It can be quite a job to screen through this flood of advice, but when the final purified word comes out and is sent to his people, the commander had better make sure it has red-white-and-blue stamped all over it and that it amounts to equal opportunity for all. If not, he gets fired, and we put in someone else who will make sure all his people get an equal break. The more we do this and the more we show this kind of promise to that lad from George Washington Carver High School, the more he wants to come in and join us. That is our goal.

We have not reached that goal yet, but it will be your job to join hands and help push toward the goal. We are going to reach a lot of black folks, Puerto Ricans, and poor white folks who have not had a chance before, and we are going to get them in because we find these people all have the same kind of heart and the same kind of concern for this country. And we want them all.

Q: General, would you discuss the effectiveness of the DOD Domestic Action Council and its effect on race problems in the local areas.

A: Domestic Action is one of the best things we have going for us these days. We have a big program in Memphis, some programs in Mississippi, in Alabama, and in Massachusetts. My old base, Otis Air Force Base, takes a whole bunch of kids from the ghetto and brings them in during the summer. They not only let them swim and have campfires but they also teach them a little something about getting along with each other.

We also have the Race Relations Institute, just opened at Patrick, which is going to work very closely with these people. They are planning to have some seminars and courses during the summer which they intend to offer to nonmilitary people in order to help attack these problems I have talked about—the

heartful of hurt and the fistful of hate that come to us from Ghetto, U.S.A. We are trying to reach these young people early, before their minds have been closed—both the black ones and the white ones—and I assure you the problem is on both sides. You cannot be fair or candid without recognizing that fact, so we are putting a lot of emphasis on our Domestic Action programs.

Our image, as you know, has been distorted by the Rubins and the Dellingers and all these other people who for the sake of "peace" have stepped on the pride and dignity of the armed services. They have thrown a little mud on your uniform and mine. Our reaction cannot be anger and name-calling; it must be through programs like Domestic Action.

We must go out and talk to "Reverend Jones" and "Sister Smith," and we have to get them to talk about it from the pulpits, where they have the ear of the people. We must let them know that we are not a bunch of killers. When we find someone within our numbers who has gone astray and tarnished the uniform a bit, we must show we are big enough to take action against him.

We must try to make them understand that nobody hates war worse than warriors, because, hell, we are the ones who get shot at. Nothing is better for the warrior than peacetime on the post and beer call on Friday night. But, when necessary, we have to fight the enemy out there, else, while we shout freedom, we might not have the place to be free in. And this is my place, my country, right here; this is what I fight for. This is what we have to tell them in the ghetto, in the streets.

That is what Domestic Action does. It is a big program and has a lot of money in it. The man at the Defense Department level is Earl Brown. He, too, has a bit of experience at being black, although a little less than I have. Incidentally, he is a hell of a fighter pilot. Earl is really in there doing some great things. We also have some white people in

there who are doing fine things. I do not know all the minute details about each of the programs, but I invite you when you come to the Pentagon to go up on the fourth floor and talk to them. They will be out here in the field to talk to you, too.

You know, I was just talking about Domestic Action with your Commandant, General Loving. I understand you had a Race Seminar here and did not have Jesse Jackson and did not have Roy Wilkins. You had better listen to those people, too. You see, if you fail to listen to them, someday you may have to listen to others like Stokely and Eldridge— and I do not believe you would like what they would say. Furthermore, they would not take the time to journey here and talk to you, but Roy Wilkins will, and so would Jesse Jackson. It is possible you might not like all they say, either, but they would tell it like it is.

That is what we are doing in Domestic Action: we are telling it like it is and attacking it where it is.

Q: Sir, you mentioned the Domestic Action Program, but what else is the Department of Defense doing—or what do you think should be done—to improve the declining military image in the United States today?

A: O.K. I did touch on that in the middle of my more formal talk, and I did it somewhat jokingly. But it is not a joke. It is a very serious proposition. It is a question of how much is enough and how far we should swing the pendulum before we start the other way.

Basically, we are trying to strike a balance between discipline and listening to our young, dissatisfied people. I hear so much about listening to the young, and for this purpose the commander has more help now than he has ever had. Unfortunately, a lot of it he does not need. But we must make sure we are listening to all sides in order to be able to come up with the right answers.

Now, I do think—and we all think—that we may have gone a little bit too far in our

search for answers by acceding to demands of people in the service who seem to want this to be like a country club. This is not a country club. We had a sign at our wing in Thailand which read, "The Mission of the Air Force is to Fly and Fight—And Don't You Forget It!" The Chief of Staff keeps that motto hanging on his door.

Boiled down, that is the mission of all the armed services of the United States of America. Of course, we would like to see the day when we could beat those swords into plowshares, but I have yet to see many shiny new plowshares. So we must maintain a viable fighting force. To do that, we have to have discipline.

I think in the regrouping that is going to take place after this war—and we are winding it down—we are going to take all these people who have not conformed to the discipline that is a must in the services and show them the gate. To some degree, we are doing that right now. They fail to do us any good in here, and they corrupt the minds of the young people who come in to us wanting to accomplish the mission.

With these remarks behind me, I will get back to part of the answer to your question, sir. What is wrong, in my mind, is that we have lacked the facing up to responsibility and accepting the challenge of the young, mad minorities. I would include in this group the very antieverything elements, some of whom came into the service mad about the draft and hating us deeply. For the most part, these are young, articulate people who are going out and gaining converts from among the others who came in to do their duty, serve their time well, and get out.

This challenge has not been picked up by the young—or not so young—articulate blacks at our staff level, higher NCO level, or young officer level who possess the kind of credibility that the young people would accept. This is part of what I am talking about.

The staff sergeant probably has a family

and does not go to the NCO Club or Service Club very much. When he finishes work in the afternoon, he goes home. He might stop a few minutes at beer call on his way home on Friday, but most of the time he is home. So he is not at hand when angry words are flung back and forth.

Well, we are getting some of these people back in the barracks, getting them to make sure they go over to the barracks and Service Club and establish some kind of rapport with these young people. We are beginning to rely on our intermediate-level leaders with guts enough to stand and say, "Look, man, assess progress. Then you will find you don't have as much to be bitter about as you think you do."

The minorities have made a lot of progress in many areas. We must point that out to our young people because most of the angry young blacks have little or no idea how bad the black situation used to be or how much it has improved. I am not saying they do not have the right to raise hell about the things that are still wrong, but I am saying that they still have the responsibility to contribute to the solution and try to solve the problems.

The same can be said about the antiwar guy who wants to come in here and in *my* uniform stand up and hold a meeting in *my* theater to tell these guys why they should hate *my* Air Force. I say "Hell, no!" He can go down to the coffeehouse off base, or he can address his grievances to me, or I can sit and talk with him about it and we can get into a dialogue. But for him to have a one-way pep rally for the disruption of the normal processes of the military, for him to want to rewrite our procedures, NO! I have a thing right here in my briefcase in which one of these guys testified before the Black Caucus last week. One of the things he wanted was liberalization of the Manual for Courts-Martial and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, with special emphasis on—get this—on drugs and homosexuality.

No, we are not going that route, and they have got to know it. But I think there are still, as the Marines say, enough good men.

Well, I think the policy of the Air Force is right down that same line. We still think there are enough young stalwarts out there so that, if we show them what the Air Force really is, if we show them what kind of leadership ours really is, and if we make ourselves examples of that leadership, we can get the nucleus to stamp out the weed. Unfortunately, we do have some bad guys, but we also have the required leadership, some of it right here at Air Command and Staff College and over at the Air War College, where I spoke a few weeks ago.

We have to be understanding but firm. For example, Sandy Vandenberg met me the other day at ATC at Randolph when I flew in there. He has a Human Relations Council, and they get together and talk, or rap, about what is wrong: equal opportunities, the blacks and whites, the militants, and the antiwar guys. These groups have been asking for more and more. First, they wanted to hold the meetings during duty hours. O.K., he went along with that. Then, they came in the other day, he told me, and said, "We don't want to wear our uniform to this thing. We want to come in civilian clothes."

Sandy asked me what I would say, and I told him I would say, "Hell, no! They should wear the uniform. After all, the problem happens in the uniform."

We never started out to be what Main Street, U.S.A. or Ghetto, U.S.A. is. We are the military. Without the discipline that goes with it, we become a mob. Now, hear me right: There are things that are wrong. There has been some neglect—more in the past, less in the present, and there should be none in the future. There are still racial problems and drug problems. There are still some things on which we can listen to the young people. For example, we can let them grow their hair a little longer and get some bigger hats.

There are other simple things we can do, like keeping cool when a man shakes another man's thumb and they beat each other's elbows, arms, and thighs, doing the "soul shake." I do not care, as long as that man is standing straight and tall when I call my formation. I do not care, as long as when I walk by he throws me a "Good morning, sir" and salutes, and I return the courtesy. We are not going to back away from that. I do not care, as long as he takes direction when I give it, without my having to explain to him why. I do not have time for that over Hanoi at 30,000 feet. He had better learn that when he is back at the post.

In short, I believe we can accomplish both tasks: maintain discipline and get good men. I say we still have enough good men in this country who will be receptive to leadership and will respect us more for drawing a firm line and hewing to it. We must correct the things that are wrong, but we cannot allow ourselves to fall on our tails while we do it. That is my answer.

Q: General, I have heard the concept of the volunteer army criticized because people say

it will consist of white officers leading predominantly black troops. Would you comment on that, please?

A: O.K. They do not have to worry about that in Hometown, U.S.A. You are right, there are a lot of people who say that if we go to an all-volunteer force we will have an all-black army, an all-Mexican army, an all-Puerto Rican army, or an all-poor-white-folks army. They should not worry about that for the reason I gave you a little while ago. There are so many opportunities for all these people now that we are having just as much—if not more—trouble in recruiting the black who has the talent we need as we do in recruiting the white. So we are just not getting them that fast. We have not lowered our standards to recruit in any of these categories, and we are not going to. But what are we going to do to attract and hold good men, and what are we doing right now in the services?

For one thing, we are working to better attune career progression in the service between the whites and the minorities. It is not easy. Picture two young lads, a black from a disadvantaged neighborhood and a white fellow from a high-rent district who possesses a lot of skills the black guy does not have. Start them out at the same time, and what do you say to the black lad at promotion time? "Sorry, son, you failed to make your stripe because you do not have the education that the white guy has"?

Well, we are trying to do something about it. We have all sorts of Headstart programs. The Navy has made a lot of progress here, and the other services are progressing also. They are holding conferences right now to devise additional ways to bring that disadvantaged lad up to the level of his contemporary. He might progress at a slower rate, but he is going to be constantly gaining as he goes.

Now, financially speaking, you cannot ever pay a man what it is worth to fight for his country, especially somebody who has done it and knows what it's all about. But we feel

we can develop the kind of responsibility in enough of our youth, backed up by some fringe benefits, like better housing, educational opportunities, and a good start when they return to civilian life, that both blacks and whites are going to be interested. And I believe we can do this while keeping our standards on the same high plateau. Then we will be able to maintain the same mix that we have now.

This idea of a mixture is one reason we do not want to rely solely on the military academies for officers. We must maintain the ROTC program so that we can keep the kind of integrated mix of races, religions, social strata, and everything else that makes it a truly democratic American military force—democratic to the point that we set. Realistically, that cannot be too permissive or it would not be worth anything as a fighting force.

In short, we must show our attractiveness to the young men that we want. Then we will get the mixture we want. We do not worry about what percent of us is going to be black or white; it will seek its own level. However, the resultant force will not be all black or all white or all Mexican or all Puerto Rican.

Even if it were, I will tell you frankly—and I do not care what the papers say about dissension and all that—if they were the kind of people that the majority of blacks, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans whom I know in this service are, we would not have a bad army anyway. They love their country just like you and I do.

Q: Sir, in grappling with the personal problems of management, we have looked at a model of General Maloy's efforts over in Korea. Without asking you to evaluate that personally, I would like to ask you for an Air Staff position on that example and if anything is being done to follow it up?

A: Yes, there is, at the Defense Department level. You know, one of the first things Mr. Laird told me when I came on board was to remember that my suit was purple—that I had to be concerned with all the services, across the board. Of course, when you wear this blue suit as long as I have and love it as I do, it is not easy to forget the color all of the time.

Nevertheless, we assimilate all the information from the Maloy effort, from General Simler's interracial fact-finding group in Air Training Command, and similar investigations, like those directed by General Catton in Military Airlift Command. Incidentally, back to Public Affairs, some writers who published stories on these reports evidently found what was wrong more newsworthy than the action taken to set it right. And, indeed, action is being taken, based on these and other reports and recommendations.

For example, just taking their seats is a new team under a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity. The number one man is Don Miller, who comes to us from the Vice Presidency at Seatrain Corporation. The number two man is Curt Smothers. Curt is the young black captain, Army type, whom many of you may have seen on one of the CBS "Sixty Minutes" programs. In

one particular segment, they were taking the Army to task about racism in Germany. Curt was the very articulate black lad who pointed out the things that were wrong and where Army justice had fallen short of the mark. He was quite critical of some of these things, but he was very factual in what he said.

Mike Wallace, who was conducting the interview, said, "Captain, you are being very candid here and very open with your answers. Aren't you afraid the Army will take some action against you?" Curt's reply went like this: "Well, I'm sure the Army can if it wants to. But I would be very surprised if they did—and very disappointed if they did—because, first of all, I am a legal officer and I'm concerned about military justice. And I wouldn't be here talking to you about these things if I had gotten the proper ear back there in the caserne. I think I'm doing the proper thing. Now, I might be stepping on some policies, and, if in fact I am, then maybe I should be called down. I think the Army is bigger than that, but if not, so be it."

He was right. The Secretary of Defense was bigger than that. They brought him up and made him an Assistant to the General Counsel in the Pentagon. Since that time, a year ago, he has been up there helping Mr. Buzhardt deal with some of these things. Now he is going off active duty status and is going to be a civilian—27 years old and a GS-15—that is quite a jump! Curt is going to be up there trying to solve those things, you see. That is what is happening in this so-called "racist" Defense Department.

Now, I know General Maloy very well. One of the things that hurts Maloy and others like him is to have an incident occur in his command while he is making headway in his programs. One of those happened. Some black guys who still figured they could not wait for his program to work went out and took over some joint downtown in which they had been treated unfairly and tore it apart. Sure enough, that story was all over the front page,

while not enough people heard about General Maloy's positive program. Once more, too many people did not get the whole story, but we have to win in spite of these breaks. Those are some of the problems we face.

Look at the efforts of Army General Mike Davison, the new commander of all Army forces in Europe. He has made tremendous progress. Now, a few weeks ago, the media gave quite a bit of coverage to his conference on race problems, which was held at Berchtesgaden. At one point in the conference, while they were discussing how many whites had been assaulted by blacks in those roving bands that we are having trouble with—over there and over here, too—General Davison said, "But you've only given me part of it. We've sat here and talked about it for fifteen minutes, yet no one has said how many blacks have been assaulted by whites. That's the kind of imbalance we've got to get away from before we can begin to address the problem." And they got along with that topic, too.

What we in DOD are doing is the result of what Davison discovers over there, what Maloy finds in Korea, what the commander of Fort Benning finds over here, and the commander at Pendleton, along with what the Black Caucus alleges, and others.

We are getting it all up there and putting the answers to it. And I think we are going to find them; I know we are!

Q: General, you have commented on the number of councils available today to the commanders, but I would like to address this specifically to unit or squadron commanders. Do we need all these bureaucracies, or do we perhaps, in your own view, need dedicated and motivated squadron commanders who have been educated specifically in race relations and human behavior?

A: We need both. But the way we get to the latter is by having the former. I have poked, with some fun and extraneous comment, at the number of societies that we have; but

this is called listening to all sides. Maybe the only way we can be sure we get all views is to have all these councils and be responsive to the things within reason that they are talking about.

We have to have commanders who are influenced by the Race Relations Institute, by the councils, by all of this information—and by our response to it. This way a commander learns a lot about the races, the problems, their feelings, and, probably, quite a bit about himself. And he starts to change, you see. Then we have a commander who obeys the regulation and makes sure it works, because he has the only thing that is going to solve it all: a moral commitment to do it because it is right. When that is done, we can dissolve all the councils and go back from "command by committee" to the single commander system.

Thank you very much.

THE OPPOSITE NUMBER

MAJOR GENERAL EDWARD G. LANSDALE, USAF (RET)

THERE are Americans who study the history of warfare in order to prepare themselves for leadership roles in future armed conflict. It is not that they have an unhealthy love of war. Rather it is their awareness of the world we live in and of man's proclivity for war that makes them study; if the United States gets into shooting trouble in the future, they want to be ready to serve our country expertly and professionally. I believe that these Americans, with their foresightedness, are admirable. In the event of war, I want them to succeed. Because I do, I offer them the following thoughts about the nature of a war which I feel may well be the next one in which Americans are involved.

In a war, of course, there are two sides, ours and theirs. Among those on the

other side against us there will be at least one person who is the real opposite number of each American military leader, whatever his rank—an opposite number who will try to out-think the American—an opposite number who will try to outdo the American.

I believe that this opposite number will be a revolutionary. I don't want him to surprise us.

Concluding from the course of studies pursued in our advanced service schools, I am aware that an American military leader is expected to have quite a different sort of opponent. I gather that he is supposed to come up against a fairly grown-up whiz kid—a bright military type who has learned to manage masses of men, money, and materiel for nuclear wipe-outs or for the "instrument of policy" gambits of power politics. That sort of thing.

I suspect that this opponent now emerges in the imagination as not too bad a guy. A professional like our Air Force professionals— only *he* is taking a course at *his* war college. Perhaps it is a national war college such as the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in Moscow or the Soviet air and naval war colleges at Monino and Leningrad. Or perhaps it is a war college such as the ones at Peking, Tirana, Brno, Dresden, Budapest, Bucharest, or Belgrade.

Well, maybe the course planners of our schools are right. But, again, maybe they are not. We live in a revolutionary era. My hunch is that history is waiting to play a deadly joke on us. It did so on recent graduates of the Imperial Defence College in London, who now find themselves facing the savagery of revolutionary warfare in Northern Ireland. It did so on the Pakistani officers under General Niazi, who undoubtedly wish now that they had learned better ways of coping with the Mukti Bahini guerrillas. It is starting to do so on Argentine graduates of the Escuela Nacional de Guerra in Buenos Aires, who are waking up to the fact that Marxist ERP guer-

rillas intend to win themselves a country with the methods of the Tupamaros next door.

Our place in history is one of great social ferment, a breeding time for advocates of making politics out of a gun barrel. As the defenders of what now exists, we are in the way of such advocates. So they are learning how to defeat us. Their education in how to do this, through revolutionary struggle, is vastly different from ours. Perhaps some of it, superficially, might look familiar, such as students attending lectures in a classroom of the associate course at Moscow's Lenin Political Academy. The subject matter is not familiar, however. Further, the graduates of such formal schools are adept at getting others to carry out the actual struggle. They step in afterwards, as organization men, to actually run things. One need look no further than Cuba for a classic example of how the fighters lost their revolution to the organization men afterwards.

Our future opponent, the hard-core revolutionary, right now is probably getting his higher schooling in his style of warfare by carrying out illegal actions on the very battleground where we will come up against him later. Or maybe he is in jail, going through some further hardening that will set him apart from other men. Most likely he is an idealist whose experiences have forced him to grow a tough hide, to cling even closer to a political ideology and a belief in its eventual success— and its eventual humanity—to answer his own doubts about the ugly things he has had to do in the name of his cause. For he probably has killed at least one person, face to face, has blown up others with plastic or dynamite, and perhaps has done his share of kidnapping, arson, torture, and bank robbery.

He might even be from an affluent family, a college graduate, a seeming member of the part of society he is seeking to destroy—as have been so many of the revolutionaries of our time. Thus, his formal education might have been much the same as ours, except that

somewhere along the line he started picking up other ideas and using them, committing himself. Perhaps these were the teachings of Mao Tse-tung, or of "Che" Guevara, or of Vo Nguyen Giap. Or perhaps they were the teachings that have supplanted Che's with so many younger revolutionaries, those in "The Minimanual for Urban Guerrillas" by Carlos Marighella. (His book tells how to make and steal weapons, describes the most valuable places to bomb, whom to attack or kidnap, and how to survive in the concrete jungles of the cities.) Or perhaps our future opponent only learned the teachings in the new training films for revolutionaries now being shown throughout this hemisphere as well as in Africa and elsewhere.

The point is that he is getting ready in a hard, realistic school, learning rules of combat vastly different from those that are being taught in our war colleges. He has many recent examples to assure him that the rules he is learning will succeed over the rules that our professionals are learning.

About all that I can do in this article is to give a glimpse of what this prospective opponent knows and does—and a further glimpse of the only way I know of defeating him. I hope readers of the article will start studying him and his ways on their own. Certainly we are going to need every bit of knowledge and alertness and wisdom possible when we come up against him.

Tʜɪꜱ possible future adversary of ours is a believer in waging total political warfare to gain his ends. His task is to destroy the existing social order. Its destruction accomplished, he intends to replace it with another social order, one that he believes to be ideal, beautiful, and as perfect as humans can make it. He says that this end justifies the means he uses, not daring to understand that ugly means only result in an equally ugly end, not the utopia he envisions.

Various names are given to this total political warfare that he wages. Among these names are "war of national liberation," "people's war," "revolutionary war," "guerrilla war," and even "insurgency." I feel that it is useful for us to think of these conflicts as "people's wars," because this helps us to focus on the most important feature of the battleground: the people who live on it. Whoever wins their support, and keeps it, wins the struggle.

We military men are great ones for studying the wars and the battles of the past. Yet, in the face of today's people's wars, it strikes me that too little time has been spent in studying the great "people's wars" of the past— the ones that are so filled with precepts of use today. Three of the people's wars of the past come to mind in particular: the American Revolution, the French Revolution, and the so-called Wuchang Uprising of 1911, when Sun Yat-sen's ideas turned China upside down.

I admit that study of these people's wars is not very rewarding in terms of conventional military operations. Somehow the critical actions in these wars seem to have been invariably offstage, out beyond the battalions somewhere. True enough, they were. Each of these wars was fought by revolutionaries as a total political war. Each saw masterful use of psychological warfare as the prime weapon in the struggle. Each resulted in the overthrow of centralized, dictatorial governmental rule by finding the weaknesses in it and then prying away at those flaws until they cracked open and the structure fell in on itself. It is significant that the French Revolution and the Wuchang Uprising overthrew centralized, dictatorial governments only to have them replaced by new centralized, dictatorial governments. It was only the American Revolution that wound up with a way in which the people could govern themselves.

Consider how Americans fought and won our Revolution. First they built a careful polit-

ical foundation for their cause, a legal brief almost, one that pled their case eloquently in the court of world opinion. Then they engaged in dynamic psychological actions, backed by armed resistance where possible. Think of what would have happened in Vietnam if the practical ideas from our own Revolution had been applied there—by our side, not the enemy's. If we had used the psychological actions of our own Revolution, Ho Chi Minh's gang would have been scaled down to their frailties and split away from popular support —just as were George III's forces. Ho's claim to be the people's leader was as phony as the claim of the divine right of kings—and every bit as vulnerable to devastating attack.

Lenin apparently heeded the lessons from the French Revolution when the Germans returned him to Russia in 1917. As is well known, the French revolutionaries were sloppy on discipline and organization, were violently moved by emotions while proclaiming themselves as men of reason, and killed their leaders at a great rate—until Napoleon appeared on the scene and took over with discipline and organization and secret police. Thus, it was not too surprising that when Lenin updated the French Revolution in his work in Russia, he essentially modernized the management techniques used by Napoleon—but did so from the start.

Similarly, while the strategy espoused by Mao Tse-tung owes much to the thinking of Sun Tzu and that of Clausewitz, his homely rules and principles for the behavior of 8th Route Army troops—at the crucial interface of his people's war in China—came right out of the experiences and lessons of Sun Yat-sen's revolution. Oddly enough, Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang leadership had as much right and chance to learn and use these rules and principles, but they did not.

So I suggest that our military leaders study history some more before they meet our revolutionary opponent. In particular, they should take another reflective look at the American Revolution: see it for what it really was, a people's war. They will have to do some digging, because many historians did not understand the nature of that war and thus interpreted it shallowly. Here are some tips for the digging:

• Learn how Sam Adams built up the Boston Massacre as a propaganda showpiece, a forceful psychological weapon. (Think what he would have done about the Viet Cong massacre of 1968 in Hue!)

• Learn how Tom Paine rallied the people to the cause, as well as how he bolstered troop morale when it hit bottom.

• Learn about the splendid agent work of Ben Franklin and others in London, Paris, and Madrid, including the arranging of clandestine support, which sounds today as though it were right out of a CIA casebook.

• Above all, gain a deep understanding of the spiritual values that Thomas Jefferson and George Mason ascribed to the way a man must look upon his fellowman.

These lessons are our true heritage for application in any people's war. Let us learn them and be ready to use them.

Lenin and Mao, although together in their view of revolutionary goals, were widely divergent in their ideas on how to reach those goals. Basically, the difference between them was that Lenin was a city boy and Mao a country boy. Thus, when Lenin thought of revolutionary action, he thought in terms of using the proletariat in the van of his class struggle. To him, the proletariat was the urban working man, the manual laborer whose only property was himself and his skills. He was the one to be organized and used in guided actions. Once outside the cities, revolutionary actions would have to be carried out by disciplined and politically indoctrinated military forces. It was thus that he won Russia.

On the other hand, Mao had a farmer's

opinion of the cities. Cities and the people in them were rather poor things, existing only on the backs of the people on the agrarian land. He once summed up his revolutionary strategy in the slogan, "First the mountains, then the countryside, and finally the cities." He organized and trained his forces at remote bases—in "the mountains" of his slogan. He then moved his forces into the countryside, indoctrinating, organizing, and governing the farmers. By the time he was ready to subdue the cities, his guerrilla forces had grown into regular armies. It was thus that he won China.

By the time of World War II, these two operational philosophies had shaped markedly different usages of guerrilla forces. When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, the Soviets formed groups of partisans to operate in German-occupied territory. These partisan groups were considered to be mere adjuncts to the Red Army, subject to its needs and operating primarily to ensure the success of the regular main forces. As an illustrative parallel, the doctrine of Soviet chiefs towards their partisans was almost identical with the doctrine of U.S. military commanders towards guerrilla forces, such as those in the Japanese-occupied Philippines. They were auxiliaries to main forces, not the core upon which main forces were to be built.

In contrast, Mao's guerrillas in China were far from being auxiliaries of any regular army. For one thing, the only regular Chinese armies fighting the Japanese invaders were those of the Kuomintang leaders, Mao's deadly rivals, for whose eventual defeat he was planning already. Thus, all he had to start with were rural guerrillas. Necessity mothered his invention of them as the nucleus for regular armies, which he built up once he controlled enough territory and manpower to make positional warfare feasible.

Or, put another way, Mao evolved a way in which a poor man could conquer a country with guerrilla forces. The Soviet partisan doctrine required that horribly expensive thing,

a regular army, before it could go to work. It is small wonder that Mao's ideas brought a gleam to the eyes of have-nots in country after country around the world. With Mao's methods, a revolutionary did not need to be a multibillionaire to start a guerrilla war to win himself a country. All he needed was ambition, lots of ability, energy, and iron discipline—along with a cause to be sold to the people. Thus, most of the guerrilla wars of the past two decades have been instigated and led by revolutionaries who tried hard to stick by Mao's guerrilla principles. Participants who wrote down rules of this warfare, such as Che Guevara or Giap, actually merely noted their versions of what Mao had meant. This is worth remembering when one searches out readings on guerrilla warfare for study.

Giap and other Vietnamese Communist leaders were students of Mao in Yenan, where they first learned their guerrilla trade. Thus, it is understandable that they have taken great pride in having added a new wrinkle to their old master's strategy. In fighting the French in Indochina, the Vietnamese Communists actually entertained the thought that they could carry their political war to metropolitan France. They not only would apply Mao's strategy in Vietnam but also would sap the will of the mother nation thousands of miles away, around the world from Vietnam. There were revolutionaries in France. The Vietnamese got to them. By the time the battle of Dien Bien Phu took place in Indochina, the Vietnamese political warfare in France was succeeding. There were mass demonstrations in France against the war. Large numbers of draft-age youngsters were hiding out from military service. Troop transports were blocked from sailing. There were serious morale problems and drug usage among the troops. There was a terrific din from pulpit, press, and political circles against the immorality of the French war in Indochina.

Nobody should have been surprised a decade later when, with U.S. troops fighting a

war in Vietnam, across the world from home, similar political warfare broke out here in the United States. Nor should it be labeled "paranoia" to say so. Skilled political warfare should be respected, not just dismissed with a flip and fashionable put-down.

Soviet and Chinese strategies and tactics, of course, were seen by their manufacturers as export products, once the revolutions in Russia and China had succeeded. As a result, markets for these ideas have been lively for some decades now in many countries of the world. As they are tried, there are combinations and variations that grow out of local conditions. One current model has some of the old parts in it but really does not look like the old familiar types. It is the making of a revolution through urban guerrillas, a style that is undergoing constant innovation and refinement today. In several countries it is growing beyond the capabilities of urban police forces to cope with it and is becoming a problem for military forces.

Now, I am not claiming that revolutionaries are ten feet tall and can whip their weight in wildcats. All I am saying is that they look at armed struggle differently than we do and that they are dangerous. They have some human failings, too. The story of modern revolution in Venezuela is a case in point.

About ten years ago a team of revolutionaries in Venezuela blew up some oil pumping rigs on Lake Maracaibo. The rigs belonged to Venezuelan subsidiaries of U.S. oil companies. The sapper team had been trained in Cuba and did the sabotage raid in the name of the National Liberation Front (FLN) of Venezuela. Their action got a lot of attention in the world press and thus fulfilled much of its purpose. It also gave me a good excuse to get out of my Pentagon office for a look at the situation in Venezuela. And so I did.

In finding out what I could about Venezu-ela before the visit, I included a talk with Joe Kornfeder. I had met him through my Chinese guerrilla friend, Bernie Yoh. Korn-feder was a graduate of the Lenin Political Academy in Moscow, having attended its second class, just after the one that had Ho Chi Minh as a student. Kornfeder was one of the founding members of the U.S. Communist Party in 1919 and later was an executive in the Comintern, but he had sickened of what he was mixed up in, had quit, and was devoting the rest of his life to fighting Communists. When I asked him about Venezuela, he gave me a sort of rueful smile and told me about how the Venezuelan Communist Party and its revolution got started. He had had a hand in it.

One of Kornfeder's earliest assignments as a professional revolutionary was to organize Communist movements in the northern tier of South America, including Venezuela. He was to do this among the proletariat, as he had been taught at the Lenin Academy. He went to Venezuela, in the guise of a U.S. trade unionist, and started to organize the workers there for a book-style class struggle. To his dismay, he discovered that most of his contacts in labor circles were actually members of the secret police or their informants. Venezuela was a dictatorship under Gomez at the time, and undesirables such as Kornfeder went to prison and disappeared. Kornfeder realized that he would have to act fast if he was to save his hide. The only possibility for help he could think of was a professor at the Central University in Caracas. A social friend in the U.S. had given him a letter of introduction to the professor, suggesting that the two of them might have a drink or dinner together. So Kornfeder visited the professor, gave him the letter, told him of the spot he was in, and asked for advice. Impulsively, the professor promised to hide him from the secret police.

Kornfeder hid with the professor for days until he could get out of the country safely.

PACIFICATION FROM THE INSIDE

In the Republic of Vietnam in August 1965, Nguyen Tat Ung became Minister for Rural Reconstruction, charged with pacification of the countryside. On the eve of his first field trip, an informal meeting brought together Ung (below left, with glasses) and knowledgeable Vietnamese leaders and workers to discuss practical courses of action, at the home of U.S. adviser Major General Edward G. Lansdale (gesturing). The next day Ung was killed in a plane crash. . . . Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky (below right, with Lansdale), thoroughly committed to the pacification program with its stress on protecting and helping farmers and villagers, sought another dedicated person to head it. . . . He picked General Nguyen Duc Thang (opposite top). The dynamic general not only quickly got a government program going nationwide but also became personally involved with the problems of the people in the rice paddies. . . . Thang (center), having inaugurated an adult education program, watches as a farmer's wife shows him that she has learned to write. . . . Thang became distressed at some of the Americanized practices of farm and village children, particularly their yelling "Okay" at U.S. troops and begging cigarettes and gum, instead of extending traditional Vietnamese greetings. He frequently stopped to give paternal instruction on politeness (bottom) until one day when he returned home to be greeted by his own children with "Hey, poppa, you okay. Gimmee cigarette." Bemused, he concluded that he'd better begin his crusading at home!

General Lansdale entertains Nguyen Tat Ung, first Vietnamese Minister for Rural Reconstruction.

After Ung's untimely death, Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky selected General Nguyen Duc Thang for the post.

General Thang, conferring with Lansdale, was eager to take his program to the people.

In adult education classes many rural people, like the woman here, first learned to read and write.

General Thang teaches village children traditional Vietnamese courtesies.

He found the professor to be not only sympathetic to his ideas but eager to organize a Communist Party in Venezuela. Soon the professor was bringing friends to the house for secret meetings with Kornfeder. They organized the Party. It was a far cry from the proletarian movement that Kornfeder had been charged with creating, and he was not too proud of the substitute. Its members were intellectuals from the upper and middle classes of the country.

They had a significant advantage, though, in the tradition of academic freedom accorded universities in Latin America. There the campus is a hallowed place, sacrosanct from police or governmental interference. Thus they discovered that the university made an ideal safe haven for revolutionary organization. In effect, the campus became the "remote base" envisioned in Mao's doctrine—only, instead of being in the mountains, it was located right in the heart of the nation's capital city. What started as an accidental makeshift in Venezuela soon became the fashion in South America, with universities becoming the birthplaces and freeholds of various national Communist parties.

By the time of my visit, years later, Venezuela had thrown out her dictators. A democratic regime was in power, one supported by both the workers in the cities and the ranchers in the countryside. The Communist Party had attempted one Maoist-style guerrilla action, starting with a base camp in the western mountains, only to discover that the people living there were not about to join any nutty cause to overthrow the government. The people felt that the government now belonged to them. They helped the police chase the Communists out of the mountains.

While I was in Venezuela, university students took advantage of their mid-year vacation and made another try at starting a Maoist guerrilla force. This time they raised the flag of the National Liberation Front in the Falcón Hills. The students quickly discovered that

they again had picked the wrong place. This time they found not only that there were no people in the hills but that there was no water either. Canteens empty, they had to come down out of the hills. (Intellectuals are not always bright when it comes to practical, everyday matters.)

With their attempts at following Mao's doctrine a failure and as aliens to the urban proletariat, the Communist intellectuals had to make their revolution another way. They chose urban terror, waged by youth recruited from affluent families, in an attempt to destroy the established order at its center. The university was their safe-haven base. Students formed an FLN brigade on campus, with headquarters in a dormitory that they renamed "Stalingrad." Each morning the student brigade, mostly armed with submachine guns, would march out to the flagpole in the center of the campus and raise the FLN flag. It was a rather public affair, since main city streets skirted the campus and were filled with people going to work during these ceremonies.

Between classes and at night the students indulged in such off-campus thrills as committing murder, kidnapping, bombing, armed robbery, and intimidation. The police, the government officials, and the foreign community were the main targets. Policemen stopped wearing uniforms while off duty, instead changing into them on arrival at the station house and then making patrols only in pairs or squads. When alone and identifiable, they were subject to quick death.

One night I stayed at the Officers Club in Caracas. In the early morning hours four students drove up to the entrance in a Chrysler Imperial, two boys and two girls. One of the girls stayed at the wheel. The other girl swayed drunkenly up to the sentry at the door, put a cigarette to her lips and asked for a light. While the sentry was looking at her, one of the boys stepped up behind him and shot him in the back, killing him. The other boy raced inside the building and tossed a

grenade into the empty corridor. Then the students went roaring away in the car. It was a typical action, lasting only brief moments.

Despite such urban terrorism over the years since then, the revolution has not succeeded in Venezuela. It remains too close to being simplistic anarchy in a place and time unripe for anarchy. In other countries, though, revolutionaries have done their political homework. They are making more sparing and more skillfully telling use of urban terror—as an identifiable instrument of their political program, which they have attempted to tie into popular needs. I expect that we shall get some firsthand experience with urban terror in the future, as targets often do.

Now we come to the crunch. It is this: How does a country defend itself against modern guerrilla attack?

Preliminary to any answers, it is worth taking a look at the way an enemy defines his method of attack. The enemy in Vietnam told us his, plainly, in just seven words. Le Duan, one of the leaders in Hanoi, described the Communist actions in Vietnam as *"exploiting internal contradictions in the enemy camp."* We should all think about those seven words. They give the essence of the strategy that the United States will encounter in people's wars.

In Vietnam, the Communists clandestinely organized a political structure in villages and towns. The political cadre in this structure spotted contradictions in the political and economic systems, called them to the attention of the people, and exacerbated popular feelings about them, getting the people first angry about these wrongs and then to hating them. At this point the enemy would get the people to join their ranks, to right the wrongs. These contradictions were acts by political and economic leaders that could be portrayed as acts dishonoring the people's respect for and trust in such leadership. The political leadership was especially vulnerable. It had

representatives easily identified by the people —a district chief, a policeman, a military man. Any misbehavior by such a government man was blamed not only on the individual but also on his boss in Saigon. Diem, Thieu, Ky— all the leaders in Saigon—have been subjected to this type of attack, some quite effectively. Americans in Vietnam, and through them the U.S. President, have similarly been targets.

One of the earliest contradictions in Americans exploited by the Communists was our stated purpose for being in Vietnam. The political cadre would tell villagers: "The Americans claim to be here to protect your freedom. But they are liars, as you shall see." The cadre would then fire on our troops or aircraft. Noting hostile fire, our folks would blast back at the village. There would be village casualties. The Communist cadre would then say to the villagers: "See, the Americans are not your friends but are your enemies. Join us and help drive them out of Vietnam." This happened over and over again. Some Americans never did learn that, by this psychological judo, the enemy used our strength to have us hurt ourselves.

Of course, the perfect defense against a strategy that exploits contradictions is not to have any contradictions that can be exploited. Since perfection is not a human trait, the defender should do the next best thing: strive honestly and vigorously to remedy any weaknesses that make a country's leadership alien to the people instead of being one that serves the people and reflects their will. Graft, brutality, self-serving and bullying misbehavior, even overweening autocracy—all are weak spots in the defense. If they are not corrected, the defense remains vulnerable. With clean hands, officials, troops, and police can join hands with the people, and together they can rid the body politic of a common enemy. This is a sound defense. It works. I saw it done in the Philippines. It happened in the western mountains of Venezuela, when the people refused to help the Communists

overthrow the government because they looked upon that government as their own.

With such a sound defense, the defenders can then go into a counterattack, adopt the enemy's strategy and exploit his contradictions. In Vietnam, for instance, the leaders in Hanoi keep speaking in the name of the people. Yet the people of North Vietnam have had no true choice in selecting anyone to speak for them. The only two elections in the last 25 years in North Vietnam were controlled ones, in true police-state style. So the position of the leadership in Hanoi is a contradiction, vulnerable to attack. The people of North Vietnam and the people of the world could be made to see this—if our side made the effort. It would be worth it. Hanoi's leaders planned, prepared, and carried out the aggressions in South Vietnam. If they were made to stop doing this, the war would end.

There are hundreds of ways to carry out psychological and political attacks against Hanoi's leadership. Think of what would happen if each of our bombing raids against North Vietnam were undertaken only after publicly announcing a new, specific act of aggression in South Vietnam—an act of aggression which we honestly identify as having been ordered by Hanoi: the Communist leaders made a new act of war, we label it

for what it actually was, then we in return must damage the leaders' ability to make war. It would put the burden of "to bomb or not to bomb" squarely on their shoulders, for all to see.

Much the same could be done about prisoners of war. We can go directly to the people of North Vietnam by leaflet. We could give them the names and status of their thousands of homesick men now prisoners in the South. We could bluntly tell them that the only thing preventing their seeing these men again is the selfishness of their leaders in Hanoi. We are willing to exchange prisoners; all the North Vietnamese people have to do is demand this of their leaders. Such actions—pitting the people against the leaders—are part of the real arsenal of people's wars.

Above all, as Americans, let us be true to our own heritage. We have an ideology that is a rousing battle cry of freedom to people all around the world—if we serve it faithfully. It is stated plainly in our Declaration of Independence and in the Bill of Rights. It is our strongest rallying point in a people's war. Free people—and those yearning to be free—are still expecting Americans to uphold our finest ideals wherever we serve. Let's show them that we can do so!

Alexandria, Virginia

WINNERS AND LOSERS

A Conceptual Barrier in Our Strategic Thinking

Dr. Ralph E. Strauch

CONCEPTS of limited strategic conflict for coercion or bargaining purposes have been discussed by strategic theorists for over a decade. Until recently, however, these concepts have had little impact on the institutional concepts and images of conflict that provide the foundation for strategic planning within the U.S. defense community. Those concepts and images of conflict have, for the most part, remained centered around general nuclear war (the rapid and massive exchange of most of the U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals) and assured destruction (the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union in such an exchange) as a deterrent to general nuclear war.

A number of factors, including the recent buildup of Soviet strategic forces, have resulted in increasing concern within the U.S. defense community about the adequacy of these concepts and the ability of our strategic forces to deal with potential future conflict situations. This concern is reflected in President Nixon's much-quoted questions in his 1970 foreign policy statement:

Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined and should it be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face?[1]

and in 1971's answer to that question:

I must not be—and my successors must not be—limited to the indiscriminate mass destruction of enemy civilians as the sole possible response to challenges. This is especially so when that response involves the likelihood of triggering nuclear attacks on our own population. It would be inconsistent with the political meaning of sufficiency to base our force planning solely on some finite—and theoretical—capacity to inflict casualties presumed to be unacceptable to the other side.[2]

I want to explore the thesis that a major part of the inflexibility in our current strategic capabilities stems from the institutional images of strategic conflict which form the foundation for our defense planning. These images, even of limited strategic conflict, are based on an underlying idea of conflict as a process that separates the protagonists into a winner and a loser according to criteria which both accept. This "winner-loser" image is, I believe, inadequate to deal with problems of limited conflict between nations that possess the ability to destroy each other's societies.

The premise underlying this thesis—that there are identifiable institutional concepts and images of conflict on which our defense planning rests and that these concepts and images impose significant constraints on the capabilities we realize from our strategic forces—is itself subject to question. The validity of the premise must be judged on subjective grounds, since there are no objective standards by which to prove or disprove it. I believe it to be valid. Organizations and institutions—far more than individuals—tend to adopt and fit themselves

around a small number of unifying concepts and ideas. This is due in part to the need for a simple conceptual framework to serve as an institutional "language" for internal communication. Once adopted, however, the language imposes limitations on the issues with which the institution can deal readily and on the way it perceives those issues.

Even granting this, however, these institutional concepts and images are difficult to identify and explicate, and, when identified, they appear as grossly oversimplified caricatures that almost no one would accept as valid. This is because most experienced individuals within the defense community possess a richer and deeper understanding of the problems with which they deal than is reflected in the institutional concepts of the community as a whole. In their day-to-day activity, however, this deeper understanding is often set aside, with phrases such as "These considerations are important, but we'll ignore them for the time being" or "This formulation leaves a lot out, but it's the one everybody uses, so it will have to do for now." As a result, the caricatures become accepted by the institution as adequate representations of reality. It is these caricatures, then, which few individuals in the defense community would accept without reservation but which are accepted and used by the community as the "operating principles" underlying our defense planning, with which this article deals.

the winner-loser image of conflict

Though the realities are far more complex, warfare is commonly thought of as resulting in a clear and unambiguous division of the protagonists into a *winner* and a *loser*—the victor and the vanquished—according to terms of reference that both accept. The conflict is thought of as terminating when one protagonist "agrees to lose" and to accept the terms imposed upon him by the winner. The winner, in turn, acknowledges this agreement and imposes the terms he desires. This

may occur when the loser has no other option, when his military forces are effectively destroyed and the winner is in *de facto* or near *de facto* control of his territory, or it may occur considerably earlier if the loser decides that there is no point in continuing. The defeat of France by Germany in 1940 is an example of the latter type, while the later defeat of Germany in 1945 comes closer to the former.

These perceptions lead easily to a highly simplified "winner-loser" image of conflict, in which all political considerations are abstracted out, and a "win" is defined by the achievement of what appear to be the operationally relevant military goals—destruction of the opponent's military forces, occupation of his territory, etc. The purpose of the conflict, then, and of the military forces employed in it can be seen as determining the "winner," according to that definition. This image provides the foundation for most peacetime defense planning. Winning is defined in terms of the operational objectives for which it is anticipated that military forces would be applied in conflict, and peacetime defense planning is directed at attaining the capabilities needed to achieve those objectives. The objectives, in turn, provide analytical yardsticks against which to measure the adequacy of the preparation.

The label of "winner," however, seems unlikely to apply in any reasonable way to either protagonist in a future U.S.–Soviet general nuclear war in which most of the arsenals of both sides are used. Each now has, and seems likely to retain, enough destructive power to ensure that, if it is used without restraint, the term "loser" would be far more appropriate for both sides. This has been an accepted fact of life since the early 1960s, and for this reason the deterrence of nuclear war, rather than the ability to fight one successfully, has been the primary objective of U.S. strategic policy. Even our basic concepts of deterrence, however, are derived from an underlying winner-loser image of warfare.

Our deterrent is based on ensuring that the Soviet Union would "lose" in a general nuclear war. We translate this into an operationally relevant military objective—the "assured destruction" of the Soviet Union as a functioning society following a Soviet attack—and we maintain strategic forces sufficient to achieve that objective. The fact that our underlying objective is deterrence notwithstanding, then, we view general nuclear war, for planning purposes at least, as a winner-loser conflict in which "assured destruction" of the Soviet Union, in spite of Soviet destruction of the United States, constitutes a "win."

Their mutual ability to destroy each other induces considerable stability in U.S.–Soviet relationships. In spite of that stability, however, significant differences and sources of disagreement between the two nations will continue to exist. We cannot ignore the possibility that those differences will lead to conflicts that must be resolved by military force, possibly at the strategic level. Our ability to deal successfully with future strategic conflict will depend in part on the adequacy of our concepts of conflict when the conflict occurs. If we are prepared for only general war, we ensure ourselves the position of loser by providing ourselves with only the alternatives of capitulation or holocaust. The possibility of strategic conflict at less than the general-war level is one we must be prepared to deal with if it arises.

Our current institutional concepts of strategic conflict at a less-than-total level, whether at high levels of counterforce exchange or at low levels of limited strategic conflict, are also based heavily on a winner-loser image. The winner and the loser, perhaps, are defined in less total terms and with significant constraints, but nonetheless the image of a well-defined winner and loser is clear. This image is conveyed in phrases such as "termination at a relative military advantage" or "he will quit when his potential losses outweigh his

potential gains." The image carries with it the implication of the mutually acceptable definition of "victory," or at least of "being ahead," and the assumption that one side would be willing to quit at a time when he is a "loser" by that definition, but still retains the capability to inflict enormous damage on the other. The implicit assumption is often made, in effect, that *political leaders directing the course of a strategic conflict would do so according to objectives and criteria which analysts find convenient for evaluating military forces.* If conflict between nations were a board game, like Monopoly, with clearly defined rules and mutually accepted methods of keeping score, this view would be reasonable. Reality, however, is far more complex. The same problem and the same situation may look considerably different to different people, or nations.

It is sometimes argued that such assumptions are made for "analytical convenience," and the results must, of course, be interpreted in a larger context. This argument would be valid if, in fact, the problems of interpretation in a larger context were regularly considered and addressed; but they seldom are. It is standard practice in the analysis of strategic forces and capabilities to perform "sensitivity analysis" to determine the sensitivity of the conclusions to variation in the values of the numerical parameters describing weapon systems performance. "Sensitivity analysis" of the sensitivity of the conclusions to the assumptions made about the objectives, motivations, and behavior of the protagonists, however, is performed only infrequently and is rarely done systematically.

The winner-loser image is a convenient one on which to base the defense planning process in peacetime, and perhaps that fact is a major reason for its predominant role in that process. It assumes that when strategic forces are employed in combat they will be employed for well-defined, operationally relevant, "military" objectives. This implies, in turn, that

if those objectives can be determined in advance, then the capabilities required to achieve them can be identified and procured, and the war plans to utilize those capabilities can be developed in an orderly and systematic manner. Defense planning, therefore, can be made into a systematic quantitative process and carried on in a manner which provides "high confidence" that the objectives of conflict can be adequately met if the conflict occurs. The "high confidence" apparently provided, however, is based on the assumption of the validity of the winner-loser image. It does not reflect the basic inadequacies of that image or the degree of confidence which one might reasonably place in the likelihood that the "objectives" being met would be reasonable national objectives at a time of conflict.

strategic conflict as a process of bargaining

Should a future strategic conflict occur between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, it seems likely that it would come about as something neither side really wants but that at least one side feels itself forced into, possibly as a result of bad judgment or miscalculation by one or both sides. The minimization of the amount of force used and the avoidance of escalation to high levels of violence are likely to be major objectives of both sides. The ability of each to assure, at the price of being a loser itself, that the other is also a loser will create intense pressure for resolution in a manner which allows each to claim at least a partial win and forces neither to accept a clear-cut loss.

The conflict is likely to be resolved, then, not on a "winner-loser" basis but through a process of bargaining to achieve a mutually acceptable outcome, where acceptability is defined in terms of the preservation of broad national interests and objectives. What looks acceptable at the termination of the conflict, moreover, may be considerably different from what looked acceptable at the beginning, for

both sides. A "final solution" to the under-lying dispute, in the sense that the victory in World War II was a "final solution" to the German problem, is unlikely. Solutions, in-stead, will be temporary expedients, resolving the immediately crucial issues and passing the underlying differences on to the future. Whatever settlement is finally reached, each side will accentuate those aspects of the settle-ment which it finds favorable and downplay those which it finds unfavorable. A "winner-loser" image seems particularly ill-suited to describe (and to prepare for) this form of conflict. Rather, it should be viewed as a bargaining process, engaged in reluctantly, at best, by one and perhaps both parties.

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 perhaps was a prototype of this form of conflict resolu-tion. The Soviet Union attempted the clandes-tine deployment of intermediate-range and medium-range ballistic missiles to Cuba. The United States discovered this shortly before the missiles became operational and placed a naval quarantine around Cuba to prevent further introduction of strategic offensive weapons. A settlement was reached in which the Soviet Union removed its missiles and agreed not to reintroduce them, and the United States pledged not to invade Cuba.

The crisis involved a minimal level of violence. The only combat casualty was an Air Force U-2 pilot. The confrontation, none-theless, contained many of the elements that might be present in a future limited strategic conflict. U.S. military forces were used—the naval forces involved in the blockade. The use of other forces—U.S. air power against Cuba and Soviet submarines against the naval blockade forces—was threatened, at least in-directly. The threat of nuclear war hung in the background and significantly affected the decision processes, and the behavior, of *both* sides. The actions taken by both sides show a strong interest in restraining the escalatory process and resolving the dispute with a mini-mum of violence.

Who won, the U.S. or the Soviet Union? In the U.S., a nearly unanimous view seems to be that we did. Soviet offensive missiles were removed from Cuba, and we obtained a clear pledge that they would not be re-introduced. Relative to the situation which would have resulted had the U.S. been unwill-ing or unable to act, therefore, the U.S. was clearly a winner. Relative to the situation which would have resulted had no Soviet attempt to introduce the missiles been made, however, a strong argument can be made for Soviet victory. In Soviet eyes, the U.S. prob-ably represented a real threat to the Castro regime prior to the crisis. In the spring of 1961, the U.S.-supported invasion at the Bay of Pigs had failed. Following this, sentiment ran high in the U.S. in favor of decisive mili-tary action against the Castro government. The objective evidence, coupled with traditional Russian distrust of the West, would have provided ample grounds for a Soviet assess-ment that a U.S. invasion of Cuba was a real threat. This threat would almost certainly have been one of the justifications used when the decision to introduce the missiles was being debated and made. (It is, by the way, the justification advanced by Khrushchev in his memoirs.)[3] The crisis ended with a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba and with *de facto* U.S. recognition of Cuba as a Communist stronghold in the western hemisphere, with continuing significant Soviet presence there. Khrushchev described the settlement in a speech to the Supreme Soviet in December 1962 as follows:

We declared that *if the U.S.A. pledged not to invade Cuba* and also restrained other ally-states from aggression against Cuba, the *So-viet Union would be prepared to remove from Cuba the weapons the U.S.A. calls "offen-sive."*

In reply, the President of the United States, for his part, declared that if the Soviet gov-ernment agreed to remove these weapons from Cuba, the U.S. government would lift the quarantine, that is to say the blockade, and

give assurance of the rejection both by the United States and by other countries of the Western hemisphere of an invasion of Cuba. The President declared in all definiteness, and the whole world knows this, that the *United States would not attack Cuba* and would also restrain its allies from such actions.

But after all, *this was why we had sent our weapons to Cuba, to prevent an attack on her!* Therefore, the Soviet government confirmed its agreement to withdraw ballistic missiles from Cuba.

Thus, in short, a *mutually acceptable settlement was reached* that signified a victory for reason and success for the cause of peace. The Cuban question moved into the phase of peaceful negotiations and, as concerns the United States of America, was transferred there, so to say, from the hands of generals into the hands of diplomats.[4] (Emphasis added.)

It has been argued that the outcome of the missile crisis was a significant factor in Khrushchev's fall from power. Even if true, this in no way detracts from the central point of this argument: that the way out chosen *at the time* could be interpreted *at the time*, if not as a clear victory, as far less than a clear defeat. The interpretation of the outcome as a clear U.S. victory was not, after all, universal even in this country. There was significant criticism at the time, and subsequently, of the President's noninvasion pledge and of his failure to secure the complete removal of the Soviet presence from Cuba. In spite of this criticism, securing the removal of the missiles was a major U.S. achievement.

The explanation put forth by the strategic folklore, that the U.S. "won" because of our "strategic superiority," hardly seems borne out by the facts. It is far too simplistic. U.S. actions were too cautious, and too tempered by the desire to avoid nuclear war, to support that explanation. The U.S. was, in fact, deterred from direct military action against Cuba, at least until the blockade was tried. What we did have was the will, the *skill,* and

the military capability to apply a blend of military and political pressures and concessions sufficient to arrive at an acceptable resolution with minimal use of force. All three elements —will, skill, and military capability—were required, and no two, without the third, would have been sufficient.

It is important to note that neither side attempted to force a resolution in a manner which would force the other to admit, or accept, a clear loss. The actions of each side were strongly influenced by the desire to reach a settlement that was acceptable to the other and to avoid escalation to higher levels of violence. Such a settlement was possible because each side could and did look at it differently, accentuating the aspects of the settlement which were to its advantage. It seems likely that these same influences would have continued to work, perhaps even more strongly, had higher levels of violence occurred. It also seems likely that these influences will be strongly felt in any future strategic confrontation or conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

This mutuality of interest in avoiding general war and finding a mutually acceptable resolution of conflict is frequently expressed by describing limited strategic conflict as a "non-zero sum game." That description, however, may obscure the nature of the bargaining process as much as it illuminates it. The idea of a "non-zero sum game" carries with it the image of a well-structured problem, with the objectives of each side well-defined and unchanging—as well as the relationship between the actions available to each and the achievement of those objectives. It allows the possibility that each side is using a different method of keeping score, but it still assumes that both are playing the same game. One of the central features of future conflict may well be the fact that both sides are playing quite different games for quite different reasons, and that the perceptions of each side about its own, as well as its opponent's game, are con-

tinually changing. This implies that preconceived images of the nature of the conflict, and of what constitutes acceptable outcomes, are likely to be inappropriate and possibly dangerous, as are military plans derived from such images. The nature of the dispute, and the objectives of both sides, are likely to differ considerably at the start of a conflict from the stereotypes held prior to the crisis. Our ability to resolve future conflicts satisfactorily may depend on our ability to modify those stereotypes.

In the Cuban crisis, the U.S. was able to adapt to the requirements of the situation on an ad hoc basis—to overcome the institutional "winner-loser" bias in our defense planning and use the inherent capabilities in our military forces to fashion effective tools to resolve the crisis acceptably. Our ability to adapt with equal success in the future, however, seems problematic, and to rely on ad hoc adaptation seems dangerous.

This suggests the need to develop an alternative "bargaining process" image of conflict that more adequately (and explicitly) reflects the probable importance of political context in future strategic conflict, and to bring this image to bear more explicitly in the peacetime defense planning process. Such an image would put less emphasis on well-defined threats and responses and more emphasis on providing a range of responses to an ill-defined spectrum of threats, without attempting to identify *a priori* the "best" response to any particular threat. It would bring into sharper focus the values of diversified, flexible, and adaptable strategic forces, capable of providing such a range of options and of holding options open in the transconflict and post-conflict period as well.

The bargaining-process aspects of conflict have always played an important role in the conduct of conflict, particularly in the last two decades. From the point of view of the military planner, however, the winner-loser characteristics have usually appeared pre-dominant. However, the emergence of a mutual capability for societal destruction and the need for restraint which that capability imposes require that the bargaining process aspects of conflict receive greater attention in peacetime defense planning. Nonetheless, the institutional concepts and images of conflict on which our defense planning is based are still predominantly of the winner-loser type. These concepts and images appear to provide clear and internally consistent solutions to our strategic problems and yardsticks with which to measure the adequacy of our strategic capabilities. At the same time, they neglect or assume away many uncertainties and ambiguities in the real strategic environment and possible deficiencies in our capabilities to deal with that environment.

In the absence of severe strategic crisis, these concepts, and the capabilities developed while using them, are subject to no empirical test. Whether or not they would survive such a test, therefore, remains in doubt and is a matter that must be judged on purely intellectual grounds. (This is, of course, equally true of any alternative, including that proposed here.) We ask of our strategic forces that they be able to accept the full brunt of a Soviet attack and respond with the destruction of the Soviet society. We label that test the "worst case." That test, however, does not address, except perhaps indirectly, the underlying goal of defending and preserving our national values and interests. A better "worst case" test of that might be the ability of our strategic forces and institutions to bring us through severe (and perhaps prolonged) strategic confrontation, possibly involving the use of strategic nuclear weapons, without leading to either extreme of capitulation or the holocaust of general war. Their ability to pass that test is less obvious.

need for institutional and conceptual change

We tend to think of our military capabilities

as determined by our weapon systems and our command, control, and communications (C^3) systems. These factors do, indeed, define the inherent capabilities available to us. The actual capabilities we can derive from these forces, however, are also affected by our institutions and concepts for using them. The role of institutional and conceptual factors in determining the limits of our strategic capabilities receives little attention in our analyses of those capabilities, although it is no less important than the weapon systems or the C^3 systems. If our military institutions believe that limited strategic conflict as a method of bargaining is impossible or unthinkable, they may be unable to deal with such a conflict, regardless of the adequacy for the task of the weapon systems and the C^3 available.

The major conceptual change required is a broadening of our concepts of strategic conflict and the uses of strategic forces—a broadening which, while it need not totally reject the winner-loser image of strategic conflict, will also allow for recognition of a bargaining tool image, as well as the implications of that image. Chief among these is the explicit recognition of the high degree of *a priori* ambiguity and uncertainty about strategic conflict and appropriate forms of strategic force use in conflict. The major institutional change required is a greater institutional tolerance for ambiguity, the ability to accept and live with fundamental ambiguities and uncertainties inherent in future strategic conflict. The institutional propensity to identify those problems for which apparently satisfactory solutions can be found, and to deal only with those problems and solutions, should be replaced with the explicit *institutional* recognition of the fact that few, if any, strategic problems have clear and unambiguous formulations or solutions, at least until they actually occur.

Even once a conflict occurs, the nature of the conflict and the strategic problem it entails may be seen in various ways, each calling for a possibly different response. The set of reasonable formulations and explanations, moreover, will change as the conflict progresses, as will the objectives and criteria for settlement on both sides. The institutional ability to recognize, articulate, and resolve these differences *during* a conflict is needed. This ability to recognize different ways of looking at the problem is important to the bargaining process. Final resolution is likely to be brought about by achieving a position that is acceptable to both sides, but possibly for quite different reasons. The ability to evaluate the situation from the point of view of the Soviets and to identify ways of bending that point of view to one which is acceptable to us (and possibly bending ours to one which is acceptable to them) is of major importance. This is *not the same* as, and in fact may be considerably different from, bending the Soviet point of view to one which agrees with ours. We will want to induce them to accept a settlement that we find acceptable, not for our reasons but for whatever reasons best induce them to do so.

The Cuban crisis of 1962 provides not only an example of a compromise settlement reached through a political bargaining process but also an illustration of the fact that the important aspects of a strategic confrontation—and the imperatives requiring (and determining) the U.S. response—may be far different from those usually addressed in *a priori* analysis of future strategic contingencies.

One result of the Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba, had it been successful, would have been a change in the balance of strategic forces between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The usual formulations of problems involving changes in the strategic balance, and the need to react to such changes, are in terms of that balance alone, i.e., in terms of the weapons available to each side and the utility of those weapons in a general nuclear exchange. It has been reported that during the Cuban crisis Secretary of Defense McNamara analyzed

the problem in those terms and concluded that the change in the balance resulting from the Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba would be marginal and would only speed up the process of change that would probably take place in a few years in any event. On the basis of this view of the problem, he argued that no corrective action was necessary and that any attempt at corrective action entailing significant risks of escalation was undesirable.

Regardless of the validity of these arguments in the context of a "strategic balance" formulation of the problem, they were somewhat peripheral to the problem facing the President. In the weeks preceding discovery of the missiles in Cuba, he had drawn a clear and unmistakable line between offensive and defensive weapons and had stated categorically that he was unwilling to tolerate the Soviet deployment of offensive weapons in Cuba. He had done this largely to counter domestic criticism from Republican senators, in the belief that the Soviets had no intention of introducing offensive weapons. Nonetheless, it was done. Because of that position, the objective change in the strategic balance caused by the deployment was a secondary consideration. The credibility of the United States, and indeed President Kennedy's personal credibility as its leader, required the removal of the missiles. He was thus under pressure from what William Jones has called the "Imperial Imperative," which he describes as follows: "Kings do not voluntarily abdicate! When applied to the leader of a nation . . . it means that a decision that would obviously result in a general loss of his control, tantamount to abdication, is a decision that he will not make no matter how much it would seem to an outside observer to be in his nation's interest."[5] At the same time, Kennedy's choice of actions during the crisis was significantly influenced by his desire to allow Khrushchev a "way out" within the terms of Khrushchev's "Imperial Imperative."

During the course of the debate concerning the actions to be taken, a variety of explanations regarding the Soviet reasons for introducing the missiles into Cuba were considered. Only one of these (and one considered among the less probable) explained the Soviet behavior in terms of strategic balance.

The actions taken by the U.S. during the Cuban crisis did not involve the use of strategic forces in combat. Nonetheless, they illustrate many of the characteristics and complexities that might be present in a conflict involving those forces. The military action finally selected, imposition of the "quarantine," was chosen more for political than for military reasons. It was taken not in isolation but in combination with a number of diplomatic and political actions, including a TV speech, diplomatic notes, U.N. activity, and the implicit "threat" of further military action, if required. As the crisis progressed, a number of actions were taken to downplay the Soviet "loss" associated with removal of the missiles. Among these were the noninvasion pledge and the dropping of the initial demand for on-site inspection of the removal. The objective was to obtain removal of the missiles, not to force the Russians to concede defeat in removing them.

The quarantine itself was a course of action dictated by (and probably successful because of) the total context of the situation, political as well as military. It was chosen after consideration of a diverse set of operationally different alternatives, including diplomatic action only, air strike, and invasion as well as other variants of naval blockade. It was a course of action that we possessed the capabilities to perform, but it was not an action chosen to achieve a clearly defined *military* objective directly relevant to the removal of missiles already in Cuba. It was an option that probably would not have been given much weight in any precrisis contingency planning process.

This suggests a need for considerable flexibility to react to the requirements of the situation in contingencies requiring strategic

force use. That this need can be adequately met by detailed preplanning of strategic operations, no matter how extensive, seems doubtful. What seems required instead is the development of a variety of "building blocks" for strategic force use, capable of being put together in a manner appropriate to the overall context of the problem and the national objectives at the time the need occurs. An institutional capability for evaluating all aspects of the situation and developing appropriate strategic options in light of the total situation as it occurs is also needed. This requires a high institutional tolerance for ambiguity, a tolerance which must be carefully nurtured and developed, since the normal tendency for any organization is to attempt to structure and perform its function in a way that minimizes uncertainty and ambiguity.

The objection can be raised, of course, that, in developing the ability to look beyond the "military" aspects of force application and consider the political implications as well, the military planner is overstepping the bounds of his responsibility and moving into areas which rightfully belong to the politicians. At one time this might have been a valid objection, but this is no longer true. The nature of future strategic conflict will *demand* consideration of all aspects of strategic force use, including those usually considered "nonmilitary." The resolution of political questions and the final selection of the option to be implemented will remain the prerogative of the political leadership, specifically the President. In order to provide adequate options to the political leadership, however, the military planner must take into account the political context in which that decision must be made. If he fails to do so, the military planner is making the implicit, but nonetheless real, judgment that that context is unimportant and can be neglected. That judgment is unsupportable. In so doing, moreover, he runs the risk of providing the political leadership with an insufficient range of alternatives, all of which are unacceptable for reasons he ignored.

The change in our strategic capabilities that this conceptual shift might bring about can be summarized by contrasting a caricature of our current position with one that might result from a shift to a bargaining process image. With some, but perhaps not excessive, distortion of reality, the position of the military establishment with respect to the strategic capabilities it provides the President may be summarized as follows:

> Mr. President: We have identified a set of possible objectives for which you might desire to employ strategic forces. We are prepared, at your direction, to accomplish those objectives within the capabilities of the forces we possess. If the need arises, you need only select the objective which meets your needs and give us the word. We will take care of the rest.

In peacetime, when the possibility of conflict seems remote and the President's primary concern about the strategic forces is that they provide an adequate deterrent, this position is satisfactory. It may not remain so, however, in a crisis when he must seriously consider the use of strategic force. At that time he is likely to find that neither the objectives provided for nor the means proposed to accomplish them are very well matched to his needs. This deficiency is reflected in Robert Kennedy's description of President Kennedy's impressions of the military following the Cuban crisis:

> But he was distressed that the representatives with whom he met, with the notable exception of General Taylor, *seemed to give so little consideration to the implications of the steps they suggested.* They seemed always to assume that the Russians and Cubans would not respond or, if they did, that a war was in our national interest.[6] (Emphasis added.)

Similar mistrust marks the description of the meeting of the National Security Council at

which final arguments for a blockade and military attack were discussed:

> The discussion, for the most part, was able and organized, although like all meetings of this kind, certain statements were made *as accepted truisms,* which I, at least, thought were of *questionable validity.* One member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, argued that we could use nuclear weapons, on the basis that our adversaries would use theirs against us in an attack. I thought, as I listened, of the many times that *I had heard the military take positions, which, if wrong, had the advantage that no one would be around at the end to know.*[7] (Emphasis added.)

The objective validity of such views may be subject to dispute. Nevertheless, they may be held by a future President or some of his closest advisers at a time of serious strategic confrontation. If the President finds the military options presented to him inadequate, he has three choices: First, he can forego the use of military force altogether and accept whatever losses that entails. Second, he can accept one of the proffered options in spite of the risks. Third, he can attempt to put together an appropriate response on an ad hoc basis at the time, if necessary against the advice of his military advisers. This was the course chosen in the Cuban missile crisis.

These alternatives seem inadequate in view of the wide range of capabilities inherent in our forces. The inadequacy is traceable to the basic military position I have summarized. An alternative military position might be reached through changes in our strategic concepts and institutions along the following lines:

> Mr. President: We know that you would prefer not to have to employ strategic forces, but we recognize that contingencies making such employment necessary may arise. Our forces have a wide range of inherent capabilities, and should such a contingency arise, we stand ready to assist you in identifying and selecting appropriate strategic force options. Because of the political nature of this type of conflict, and the uncertainties inherent in it, we cannot make any *a priori* guarantees of success. At the same time, we believe we can provide strategic capabilities which may prove to be politically relevant bargaining tools *in extremis* and which will enhance your capabilities to achieve an acceptable settlement and avoid escalation to general war.

I am not proposing this conceptual shift as a way of making nuclear war more acceptable or of justifying the use of nuclear weapons to settle disputes that could otherwise be resolved without resort to war. Rather, I am suggesting it as a way of looking at conflict which might provide greater opportunity for containment and avoidance of escalation, should war come about as a result of circumstances beyond our control. This requires, I believe, that we view the use of military forces as an inherently undesirable, but occasionally necessary, tool of policy, which should be used as carefully and sparingly as possible. This attitude toward the use of military force was eloquently expressed by the Chinese philosopher Lao-tse over two thousand years ago:

> Where armies are, thorns and brambles grow.
> The raising of a great host
> Is followed by a year of dearth.
> Therefore a good general effects his purpose and then stops; he does not take further advantage of his victory.
> Fulfills his purpose and does not glory in what he has done;
> Fulfills his purpose and does not boast of what he has done;
> Fulfills his purpose, but takes no pride in what he has done;
> Fulfills his purpose, but only as a step that could not be avoided.[8]

The course I am suggesting involves a significant shift of emphasis in our strategic concepts that requires a rejection of the neat, clear-cut, high-confidence answers to our strategic problems which our current concepts appear to provide. At the same time it entails an acceptance of the fact that no clear-cut,

high-confidence answers really exist. It requires the acknowledgment of higher levels of risk in strategic conflict than do our current concepts. It might produce, however, a lowering of the actual levels of risk we face—by lessening the chances that our capabilities would prove inadequate, should the empirical test arise. By acknowledging the difficulty of the questions, it would decrease our confidence in our answers but would provide us with a better chance of having asked the right questions.

Washington, D.C.

Notes

1. *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, A New Strategy for Peace,* A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, February 18, 1970, p. 122.
2. *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's, Building for Peace,* a second annual review by Richard Nixon of U.S. foreign policy in a message to the Congress, February 25, 1971.
3. Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), pp. 492–95.
4. Speech to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in December 1962, reported in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* Vol. XIV, No. 49 (January 2, 1963).

5. William M. Jones, *Predicting Insurgent and Governmental Decisions: The Power Bloc Model,* The RAND Corporation, RM-6358-PR, December 1970, p. 12.
6. Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969), p. 119.
7. *Ibid.,* p. 48.
8. Lao-tse, *Tao Te Ching,* Chapter XXX, translated by Arthur Waley in *The Way and Its Power* (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1958).

QUO VADIS?—
THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND AIR POWER

Colonel Robert L. Gleason

ON 25 August 1970 Brigadier General Robert N. Ginsburgh, in an address to the Air War College, squarely posed one of the more salient issues that military planners must face in the post-Vietnam war period when he said of the Nixon Doctrine:

> The doctrine, of course, is still open to interpretation. If we will no longer undertake all the defense of the free world, how much will we undertake? How will it actually be implemented? How do our allies suddenly gain the strength to carry their share of the defense burden and what is their share? Because these questions have yet to be answered and the Nixon Doctrine actually put to the test, there is also a question of whether or not it will really work.[1]

This statement should create an emotion running from anxiety to near panic. For, if the Nixon Doctrine will not "really work," then what are the alternatives? The purpose of this article is not to examine possible alternatives but to concentrate on the military equations of the Nixon Doctrine and suggest ways in which the Air Force can assist in assuring that no alternative is necessary.

The Nixon Doctrine lays down in some detail the basic pattern of U.S. foreign policy and the tenor of relationships with foreign governments in the years ahead. These relationships as articulated by the President on Guam in November 1969 have three basic elements.

The first of these, that "the United States will keep all treaty commitments," represents an end or goal.

The second element states that "we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we considered vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole."

The third element presents a formula for intergovernmental relations—and also contains a strong military obligation: it states that "in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense."[2] It is in this area that the USAF may find its greatest challenge and its greatest opportunity to contribute to the fulfillment of the Nixon Doctrine in the years ahead. Therefore, this article addresses the "other types of aggression" and, more specifically, the problem of subversive insurgency—whether primarily internal in nature or externally stimulated and supported.

One of the most popular theses adopted by today's writers and political philosophers is the "No more Vietnams." Briefly stated, this thesis holds that the United States has found the Vietnam war so painful in terms of casualties, cost, and internal political turbulence that in the foreseeable future no American political leader will dare hazard another involvement of this kind.

Candidly recognizing the widespread unpopularity in which the present conflict is held by the American public, one is prompted to muse over the question of just what conditions must be satisfied before an armed conflict involving U.S. forces will be at least accepted by the American people.

From our experiences in the four major wars of this century (World War I, World War II, Korea, and Indochina) and our exposure to several near-war involvements (Lebanon, Cuba, Dominican Republic), it appears that at least one (and preferably more) of three general conditions must be fairly obvious to the American public before it indorses or even tacitly accepts its government's military involvement in a foreign conflict:

(1) The vital interest of the United States must be at stake.

(2) The conflict permits a clear-cut military victory; or

(3) If the conflict does not involve a vital U.S. interest and its nature indicates that it will be protracted and its outcome uncertain or nebulous, it must be conducted as a counterinsurgency operation with the U.S. participation confined to truly low-profile activities.

World War II is an example of a conflict satisfying the first condition. Our actions in regard to the Berlin and Cuban crises meet both the first and second conditions. U.S. action regarding Lebanon in 1958 and President Kennedy's deployment of the U.S. Marines into Thailand in response to a threat to Laos in 1962 also loosely fit the second criterion. Vietnam *circa* 1961–63 and our extensive assistance to numerous Latin American nations are plausible examples where the third condition prevailed. Unfortunately, Vietnam—like the man who came to dinner— did not remain transient in nature, nor did U.S. involvement remain low-profile. Neither did the general U.S. population sustain a conviction that our vital interests were at stake or that victory, in the accepted sense, was attainable.

Rather, as the conflict continued, Defense costs rose, and the opportunity for a clear military victory in the generally accepted sense continued to fade. Also, national frustration increased, and our initial disillusionment gradually changed to dissatisfaction. Finally, dissatisfaction gave way to outright dissent.

This, then, is the background against which the Nixon Doctrine was promulgated. The Doctrine represents a reinstilled hope that the U.S. will eventually find the key to a method of fulfilling its responsibilities as leader of the Free World—especially regarding the insurgency-vulnerable emerging nations—but will do so in a manner that will not strain the fabric of our own society. Failing this, we must accept the equally undesirable alternatives of reverting either to a pre-World War II policy of military isolationism or to the post-World War II policy of international brinkmanship through reliance on nuclear deterrence. The former alternative is highly impracticable, for World War II and events thereafter have thrust the U.S., willing or unwilling, into the position of singular leadership of the Free World. The latter alternative has been erased by the entry of the U.S.S.R. and Communist China into the nuclear club.

implementation problems of the Nixon Doctrine

To develop and explain a concept is one thing; to implement it is something else. The basic logic of the Nixon Doctrine cannot be attacked. Its conceptual tenet has been voiced by other Presidents in earlier times. President Kennedy also was obviously well aware of this concept and the frustrations associated with attempts to implement it. In a 1963 comment on the Vietnam situation he said:

> They want a force of American troops. They say it's necessary in order to restore confidence and maintain morale. But it will be just like Berlin. The troops will march in; the band will play; the crowds will cheer; and in four days everyone will have forgotten. Then we will be told that we will have to send in more troops. It's like taking a drink. The effect wears off and you have to take another.

He also emphasized that the war in Vietnam can be won only as long as it is a South Vietnam war: "If it is converted to a white man's war, the United States will lose as the French have lost."[3]

President Nixon was obviously aware of the problems of implementation when he commented that "certainly the objective of any American administration would be to avoid another war like Vietnam any place in the world. . . . " Mr. Nixon said it was very easy to say that but to develop the policies to avoid it was taking an enormous amount of his own time and that of his associates.[4]

Implementation of the military assistance aspects of the Nixon Doctrine will require at least three basic executive judgments. First,

a judgment must be made as to which of the many insurgency-vulnerable nations are sufficiently vital to U.S. interests to warrant initial or increased U.S. military assistance.

After determination is made as to which insurgency-vulnerable countries, individually or collectively, hold a high U.S. interest index, a second judgment is called for. If the degree of military support rendered by the U.S. is contingent on the effort of the subject country (and the President has stated that "America cannot and will not conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations"),[5] then how do we make an accurate judgment regarding the true extent of a given country's ability and potential to conduct the military aspects of counterinsurgency?

Later another decision must be made: whether to continue, increase, or phase out our military assistance. Of course, this will depend on whether the insurgency is arrested or escalated; and, if escalated, what will be the cost and impact of our continued involvement, chance for success, etc. One can expect that the accuracy of these decisions will be no better than the information upon which they are based.

In the past, information on a friendly foreign nation's military potential has been compiled from reports submitted through the attaché and Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) systems. However, these sources may not be adequate to support the fine-focus decisions required by the Nixon Doctrine in the future. In many cases, attaché and MAAG data also reflect the prevailing viewpoint of the host country's military and governmental leaders. Occasionally these assessments tend to be influenced by the fact that the MAAG is also charged with the responsibility of developing adequate host country military capabilities.

Even with the best of precommitment information available to a President, the decision to actually assist an insurgency-beleaguered nation cannot always be expected to be infallible. Further, the conditions existing at the moment of decision will oftentimes undergo change. Therefore, in the event that increased U.S. aid does not subdue or at least arrest the insurgency condition, another clear "'go-no-go" judgment must be made somewhere down the line. This decision point should allow the U.S. to withdraw from its involvement *without loss of prestige* or, alternatively, provide a base for significantly increasing our commitment, depending on the vitalness of the issue to U.S. security. In the event of such an escalation on our part, it should be a conscious, readily recognized step. The total risk should be examined in detail, restrictions on military operations that may stem from political realities should be identified, and professional military opinions on their effects should be sought. If after such a political/military examination we decide to deepen our commitment, this step will not have been the result of an obscured process in which the full extent of our involvement was not immediately obvious. President Nixon recognized the importance of this planning when he stated that we must "avoid that creeping involvement that eventually simply submerges you."[6]

The ultimate success of the Nixon Doctrine depends not only on its conceptual ingredients but also on the adequacy and accuracy of the military information available to high-level decision-makers.

The answer to these problems can be partially provided through a revitalization and expansion of the Mobile Training Team (MTT) concept employed by the USAF Special Operations Forces (SOF). However, before directly applying the SOF potential to the above, let us pause and examine the recent history of USAF efforts in counterinsurgency (COIN).

recent USAF special warfare history

The movement by the USAF into the insur-

gency spectrum of warfare was not a random whim to preserve for itself a novel scarf-and-goggles role of the World War II type of flying. The action was a result of National Security Council policy, which in 1961 was promulgated to all agencies of the federal government as U.S. national policy vis-à-vis the counterinsurgency threat existing in the vast underdeveloped countries of the world. This policy was, of course, our counterthrust to the U.S.S.R. foreign policy challenge embodied in the now famous "wars of liberation" dictum proclaimed by Khrushchev. The specific missions of the original USAF COIN unit, the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (later enlarged and designated the Special Air Warfare Center, eventually becoming the Special Operations Forces), were not immediately obvious even to the original cadre. Unfortunately, shortly after its formation and long before it had an opportunity to fully develop and test sound doctrine and concepts, this original COIN unit was immersed in the Vietnam war. From that point on, its entire *modus operandi* within Southeast Asia (SEA) was tailored to general purpose force use.

Perhaps a valid contrast can be drawn between the evolution of Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the Special Air Warfare (SAW) Center. One may ponder what would be the nature of SAC today if, say, six months after its initial formation it had been totally committed to either a strategic or protracted limited war. Would it ever have developed the concepts and doctrine, procedures and tactics that characterize SAC as being one of the finest, most efficient military organizations in existence? Those who were part of SAC in its youth remember the trials and the errors and the retrials that led to its present status. It took years to develop and refine such subelements as crew selection, training and quality control procedures, its flight formation and penetration tactics, customized supply and maintenance procedures, and highly respon-

sive command and control and management systems. To achieve its present pinnacle of professionalism, SAC was blessed with more than just the genius of General Kenney, General LeMay, and their staffs. It also enjoyed the indispensable element of time.

On the other hand, the SAW forces were barely formed and equipped with "first guess" aircraft when they were thrust into an environment that became the dominant influence in their further development. Unfortunately, the major characteristic of this influence has been a sharp tendency towards orthodoxy: the constant attempt to fight wars in a manner in which we feel comfortable and which has proven successful in the past. This tendency has continued until, in the later years in Southeast Asia, about the only difference between SAW and conventional forces was the age of the aircraft assigned to each. Although some consider Vietnam as a limited war and others as a counterinsurgency war, our tactics and strategy have been by and large conventional, utilizing both general purpose and SAW forces. Therefore, when we speak of the role and contribution of Special Air Warfare vis-à-vis the Nixon Doctrine, we refer not to the contemporary role of SAW in South Vietnam but rather to what it has done in Latin America, Thailand, Ethiopia, and other places.

Examples of SOF accomplishments are manifold. Early in the troubles in Southeast Asia, SOF forces (then called air commandos) established an intense and austere training program in Thailand to train the pilots of the almost defunct Royal Lao Air Force. As an immediate result of this training, the RLAF fully supported the Royal Lao Army in blunting a major Pathet Lao offensive and allowed the government forces to successfully launch a counterattack, now known as Operation Triangle. This was a classic example of transferring the knowledge and expertise of USAF tactical air operations to a friendly air force without exposing a single American to combat, thereby minimizing the chances of U.S.

involvement. This SOF accomplishment was singled out by high U.S. and Lao governmental dignitaries as being a significant major step in preserving Laotian independence at a most critical time.

In Latin America, accomplishments of the Special Operations Forces in civic action are notable. One instance, Operation Pista, occurred in 1963. In this demonstration the natives of a jungle village that was isolated from land lines of communication were enlisted through the medium of airborne loudspeakers to construct a lightplane strip, thereby opening their village to commercial air travel. An extension of this technique was carried out under the guidance of Brigadier General Gilbert L. Pritchard, first commander of the USAF Special Air Warfare Center. In this project the USAF Special Forces paradropped a small tractor, together with a U.S. Army Special Forces civic action expert, into a large but completely isolated village in central Panama. In one week the Special Forces NCO had three men checked out on operating the tractor, though the indigenous people had never operated any mechanical engine. On this occasion a strip suitable for the C-123 was molded out of the jungle. The plan was then to fly the tractor out, but so many other small construction jobs were proposed by the villagers that the tractor was passed from village to village over the next several years and maintained by airdropped logistical support.

On many occasions these Special Operations programs were applauded and personally observed by the presidents of Panama, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador, although the programs were given little local area publicity. In fact the *sine qua non* of combined U.S./host country civic action programs is to subdue the U.S. profile and magnify the participation of the host country military personnel. On the other hand,

discreet, properly oriented local publicity programs are most effective in gaining the co-operation of the indigenous population. In many respects, these episodes are concrete examples of the Nixon Doctrine in action before the Nixon Doctrine era.

the anatomy of an SOF COIN MTT

The concept followed by the SOF in these examples, and one that can provide the greatest complement to the Nixon Doctrine, is that of the Mobile Training Team.

The first step in fielding an MTT is to conduct a joint survey, usually accomplished by a USAFSOF officer and a U.S. Army Special Forces officer. The survey is conducted in-country and examines all aspects of the host country military's ability to conduct *joint* counterinsurgency operations. Operation, maintenance, supply, communications, and command and control procedures are all

examined in depth. Based on this survey and in conjunction with host country military personnel, a customized training program is structured. Normally this will consist of a six- to nine-week program involving both uniservice and—most important—*joint* training. A host country civic action program will normally be part of each exercise. It is from this pretraining survey that the first in-depth and accurate appraisal of a specific country's actual COIN capability begins to emerge.

Concurrent with and following the survey, the local military conducts a well-planned, low-toned public relations program to convince the people that the project will benefit them and improve their standard of living. The people become more receptive to the idea, and the program becomes more successful and better remembered by the recipients.

Then an MTT team is formed and deployed to an operational site within the host country. Unlike the MAAG's, which must of necessity

operate close to the indigenous air force head-quarters (and the large cities), the MTT site is usually located in a more isolated portion of a country. The USAF element of the MTT is tailored to meet the specific requirements of the host country as identified by the survey. It may (or may not) contain a strike element, an airlift element, and several support instructors, e.g., forward air control (FAC), combat control, communications, maintenance. Even with this support package, the team is rather austere, seldom exceeding 10 to 15 people. The training is normally conducted in three phases. First, both the USA and USAF elements of the team provide uniservice training to raise the proficiency of the students. This is followed by a joint training phase. Finally,

the MTT closes with graduation exercises including a 3- to 5-day joint field exercise (FTX). This is the phase that usually attracts the attention and often the attendance of the highest governmental officials within the host government.

While many virtues of the MTT type of training are fairly obvious, some of the most important are not. Besides the intrinsic value of almost any training, there are four unique aspects of MTT's that are more important than others:

• First is the fact that this training is conducted in the same environment in which the host country may at some future time be called upon to conduct actual counterinsurgency operations. Further, the training for the

The 605th Air Commando Squadron (Composite) displays equipment and armament to a group of Latin American officers as part of its mission of training aircrews in COIN air operations.

most part is conducted in host country aircraft, maintained by their own mechanics and supplied with ordnance and fuel processed through a locally established logistical system. In many cases austere bombing and gunnery ranges must be constructed before training even commences, but then these facilities can sustain follow-on training programs after the MTT departs.

This approach contrasts with a stateside-based tactical training program for foreign officers, in which foreign nationals would fly U.S. aircraft, maintained by the world's best mechanics and supported by a very affluent and efficient logistical base, and train on highly sophisticated and instrumented training ranges. Furthermore, when training is conducted in the U.S., normally only the pilots benefit, and in most cases they are already the strongest element of the foreign air force. By contrast, when the training is conducted in the host country all members of the local air force benefit. Stated another way, a cardinal aspect of COIN training is the need to provide a realistic environment. It follows that, inasmuch as foreign military personnel will never conduct actual counterinsurgency in the U.S., stateside training holds less practical value.

• A second aspect of COIN operation is its jointness, which dictates that training not only involve the host country but also emphasize the support these forces can render to their various paramilitary and civilian institutions. An unexpected by-product of past joint USAF/USA MTT's has been their impact in instilling in the host country's institutions an awareness of the need for and value of joint operations, especially in instances where long-standing culturally and politically based animosities exist between different services or between the military and nonmilitary police elements. Some of the brightest moments in past Special Forces MTT experience came as the result of breaking through these service animosities. For example, when the USAFSOF/

Army Special Forces joint MTT first arrived in the Dominican Republic in 1963, Dominican Republic army officers were not allowed unescorted on San Isidro air force base while at the same time foreign air forces (USAF) were openly accepted and given free run of the base. Similar deep-seated interservice hostilities were evident in other Latin American countries. In one memorable example the commanders of the national air force and army were cajoled by the USAF/USA MTT commander into playing golf together for the first time in their lives. The event went off amiably, though it was later discovered that the air force chief, still not sure of the atmosphere, was carrying a loaded Sten gun in his golf bag! Obviously this kind of traditional prejudice cannot be reversed in a six-week period; however, MTT's do provide an opportunity for a form of communication between the dignitaries of different services, and this may plant the first kernel of understanding.

• A COIN MTT can be conducted either before or during actual counterinsurgency activity; in the latter event, the team provides a ready vehicle for expanding U.S. materiel assistance without raising the U.S. profile. There are many examples in which this has been done with results quite different from those we witnessed in Vietnam. The Thailand experience mentioned previously is a case in point. Similarly, Special Operations expertise and some equipment (mostly airborne loudspeaker sets) were used to good advantage in defeating the Communist attempts to disrupt the Venezuelan national election of 1964. As in Thailand, no U.S. military personnel were directly involved; but through the use of airborne loudspeaker equipment, the Venezuelan Air Force assured the villagers that they could vote for the candidate of their choice without fear of Communist terrorist reprisals. As a result of this visible manifestation of their government's presence and confidence, a record voter turnout occurred, and democratic aims were well served.

• Finally, one must recognize the psychological value of the U.S. maintaining a professional rapport with these "frontier" military establishments and the necessity to do so in a manner that will not encourage emerging nations to concentrate on sophisticated high-performance prestige aircraft. SOF MTT's can accomplish this both by example and through their face-to-face instruction.

One may logically ask, Are not these the normal functions and duties of the Air Force Section of the MAAG or Military Mission? The answer is yes, but only to a degree. First, the in-country duties of U.S. Military Mission and Military Group personnel are of such a nature that only a minor portion of their time can be allocated to the direct training function. Unfortunately, a considerable amount of their effort is spent administering a rather complicated Military Assistance Program (MAP), conducting visitors around the country, and responding to the legitimate but numerous requests from other elements of the country team. Additionally, MAAG advisers are normally on a two- or three-year tour (for good and meritorious reasons), which obviously involves continuous association with the host country air force personnel. As a result they sometimes become conditioned to accept attitudes and standards that have long prevailed in that country, thus dulling their objectivity and ability to examine situations critically. This is not unique to the military— the same situation is a problem in U.S. embassies.[7] Further, the Air Missions and MAAG's normally contain only a few operational types, and their backgrounds may include very little experience in countering low-order insurgency. Finally, as a result of the professional isolation inherent in their assignment, they cannot be expected to keep abreast of the successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency techniques employed in other parts of the world. From past experience there is little doubt that a well-conducted six- to eight-week COIN training program, administered by a joint

SOF/SF MTT, provides a most useful tool for MAAG's to gauge the effectiveness of their overall training and equipage programs.

characteristics of the Special Operations Force

If the USAFSOF has the potential to assist materially in the implementation phase of the Nixon Doctrine, what then are some of the most important characteristics that it should possess in order to maximize its contribution? First, it *must not* be considered as part of our general purpose combat forces, and this differentiation should be clearly recognized. This is important for two reasons:

(1) The involvement of SOF units should not carry with it the implication of commitment of U.S. combat units.

(2) This cleavage between Special Operations Forces and conventional forces should be great enough to preclude the tendency to augment the SOF effort by adding small elements of general purpose forces, which in our eyes may be doing no more than helping the counterinsurgency effort. Unless we do preclude this creeping involvement, we may suddenly find that, as President Nixon said, it is "submerging" us.

The second characteristic of the SOF, optimized to support the Nixon Doctrine, is that its primary mission should be to *develop* COIN's tactics and doctrine and to *train* others in this skill. In effect, we should pick up and continue where we left off before the distorting effects of Vietnam set in. When SOF elements arrive in a country, they should not operate as a tactical unit intended to augment the host air force. Rather, their *modus operandi* should de-emphasize their operational combat role. President Nixon addressed this problem head on when he stated:

We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves and this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy. . . . When you are trying to assist another nation defend its free-

dom, US policy should be to help them fight the war, but not to fight the war for them. . . . We shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. . . .[8]

To do this, of course, requires high selectivity in the assignment of personnel—people who can subdue their natural "do-it-yourself" instincts and still retain their dedication and enthusiasm.

The programmed aircraft equipment (both fixed and rotary wing) for the future Special Operations Forces should certainly be compatible with the environment in which they will operate and should be readily available via MAP allocation. In this regard, a kind of "instant MAP" concept could be employed. Recognizing that the cost of fully equipped indigenous COIN units is not within the realm of feasibility for many of these countries, SOF could retain an equipment pool within its own resources. Then when it was decided to assist a key country and to require equipment beyond the capabilities of the recipient nation, a special aid grant could transfer some of the SOF equipment to the affected country, together with a training package. Again, rigid controls would be required to assure that countries would not create emergencies in order to obtain a dose of "instant COIN MAP." However, with a viable and hard-nosed MTT program, we would have the means to validate aid requests.

There are many possible postures for the post-Vietnam Special Operations Forces. We could create and maintain several SOF groups or squadrons stationed in the continental United States, each trained and oriented towards a particular geographic area of the world. Their training should include studies in the language and in the cultural, religious, economic, and political history of their respective areas of responsibilities. These squadrons would man the MTT units sent TDY to the various areas, and they could also provide a pool of individuals that could be tasked for

assignments to MAAG's, milgroups, missions, as air attachés, etc. This arrangement would have the bonus effect of providing the USAF with an in-depth pool of special area-oriented and cross-culturally trained individuals who would be retained in the field and thus reduce the cost of preparing new people for these special assignments.

Under such an arrangement, one could visualize the following sequence of assignments in the career of a young SOF officer: He would first be assigned to a CONUS SOF unit, for example, the Latin American SOF squadron. After his language and area training, he would probably serve on several MTT's in Central or South America. Later he would be selected for a PCS assignment to a Latin American Military Group or MAAG. Upon completion of a two- or three-year tour (under this arrangement, shorter PCS tours could be accommodated), he would be replaced by another SOF officer, return to the CONUS SOF squadron, and perhaps serve as an MTT commander or SOF staff officer. Later, as he reached a higher grade, he might be selected for an assistant air attaché assignment. This pattern could continue throughout an officer's career, with him moving alternately up in rank and back and forth between SOF and in-country PCS assignments.

The key to such a future SOF program is to keep it small and selective. It should never be placed in a position of competing with the conventional forces for large dollar allocation. It would have to be given at least parity consideration for the quality of assigned people. Most important, those selected for an SOF career must be recognized and enjoy advancement commensurate with non-SOF specialties.

Perhaps the most important characteristic of a postwar USAFSOF would be a dispensation from orthodoxy and a granting, in its stead, of freedom to develop both tactics and hardware in an atmosphere of no sacred cows and no compulsion to adhere to parochial patterns. In this regard, candid introspection concern-

ing our overall experience in South Vietnam (as separate from the bombing campaign in the North) tells us that we still have a lot to learn about the use of air power in counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla warfare. Nor are we the first to come to this realization. French General G. J. M. Chassin, Air Officer Commanding, Far East, reflecting on his early Indochina experiences (1951–54), listed as the first "eternal law" of counterinsurgency warfare the belief that "when offensive weapons make a sudden advance in efficiency, the reaction of the side which has none is to disperse, to thin out, to fall back on medieval guerrilla tactics which would appear childish if they did not rapidly prove to have excellent results." [9]

Developments typified by the AC-47 gunship, low-cost mobile sensor systems, and unique applications of helicopters should be the SOF stock-in-trade. Contrary to some beliefs, this last item, if applied to SOF, is not in conflict with any roles and missions agreements we have with other services. Further, as most of the helicopters in less-developed nations are in their air forces (not in their armies), this aspect of future SOF operations is most important. In short, the USAFSOF can act as a focal point and clearinghouse for all Free World ideas and concepts on the application of air power to insurgency situations. These concepts can be transplanted to any area of the world, when they are needed and when our vital interest dictates some U.S. response.

THE RECORD of the Western World in arresting insurgencies without becoming deeply involved has been spotty. Our very first exposure to the Indochina affair in 1954, following the disastrous French experience, was a very cautious announcement by President Eisenhower that "some airplane mechanics . . . who would not be touched by combat" had been sent to Vietnam.[10] But as President Nixon said, somewhere along the line we became impatient. The patience, the controls, and a finer sense of appreciation of guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare are the stock-in-trade of special air warfare. The preservation and contribution of our USAF Special Operations Forces in the postwar era can be a key element in answering the question: *Quo vadis, Nixon Doctrine?*

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Notes

1. Robert N. Ginsburgh. "U.S. Goals, Priorities, and Means," in *Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders*, SAFOII. March 1971, p. 19.
2. *Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, Ninety-first Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 243. Hereafter referred to as *Hearings*.
3. Robert F. Futrell, *United States Policy Towards Southeast Asia* (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Aerospace Studies Institute, 1968), p. 159.
4. *Hearings*, p. 249.
5. *US Foreign Policy of the Future*, Department of State Bulletin No. 1656, March 22, 1971.
6. *Hearings*, p. 247.
7. Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 225.
8. *Hearings*, p. 259.
9. G. J. M. Chassin, "Lessons of the War in Indochina," *Interavia*, VII, 12 (1952), 670.
10. Futrell, p. 27.

Military Affairs Abroad

THE LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY
Positive Roles

Major Michael A. Nelson

STEREOTYPES in international affairs are persistent and pervasive, in spite of their frequent inaccuracies. In no instance is this truer than among perceptions about the armed forces of Latin America. Some people outside Latin America, especially in the United States, conjure up visions of a comic opera in which the cast parades ostentatiously, delivers endless and meaningless harangues, and engages in capricious games of "musical governments." For others, including a few scholars, the Latin American military is the demonic political force incarnate, greedily and selfishly allying itself with other oligarchic elements to feather its own nest at the expense of the masses. Neither of these stereotypes is correct. They are incorrect because, on the one hand, the sheer diversity of Latin America dooms most stereotypes about it from the start; and, on the other hand, because they grew out of conditions which have changed so much that the perception is now archaic.

These stereotypes probably reveal more about the people who preserve them than about the Latin Americans. They indicate a common bias in which Latin American political systems are regarded as inferior because they are not democratic copies of our own. Growth and development have been assumed to be coincidental with the example of civil-military relationships practiced in the

United States. From this viewpoint any other condition becomes an aberration or a retrogression that has no value in the developmental process. This tendency to judge and prescribe for Latin Americans forms a long and persistent theme in our perceptions of and relationships with Latin American nations.

Governor Nelson Rockefeller, during his 1969 fact-finding mission to Latin America for President Nixon, discovered a deep and bitter reaction to U.S. paternalism. As a result, he recommended in his report to the President that our approach to Latin American affairs become more pragmatic and less dogmatic, that we understand that the Latin American context is not the U.S. context, and that we recognize there may be functionally positive aspects of political processes we do not like.[1]

In keeping with this spirit of new perspectives, this article re-examines the Latin American military to suggest positive roles it has played and is playing in the developmental process. Hopefully such an analysis will help dispel some of the old worn images still held about the armed forces in Latin America.

Before proceeding to the analysis, let us clarify what qualifies as positive. Professors Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., provide the criteria used in this investigation when they contend that all developing nations face four major challenges or crises: state-building, nation-building, participation, and distribution.[2] State-building is the extension of central control and authority throughout the geographic territory, while nation-building consists of developing a national consciousness in which the people believe that their welfare is inextricably linked with that of the nation. The participation crisis arises from pressures by new and wider segments of society to influence national decision-making. It does not necessarily mean that a democratic solution must follow—a sensitive single-party system might serve the function well—but that a successful solution can only be one which satisfies

or eases popular pressures. Finally, the challenge of distribution refers to the demands of the citizenry for a redistribution of national assets; in familiar terms, it is the challenge of rising expectations. Generally these challenges or crises occur simultaneously in varying degrees, and none of them is ever completely overcome; but by and large they must be tackled in the order described, since the ability to cope with each crisis depends on the success of efforts to resolve previous crises. For example, it is impossible to build a viable national loyalty if the central government is not visible and recognized in most parts of the country.

If a military activity meets one or more of these challenges, that role will be considered a positive one. Of course, some activities may detract from one challenge while assisting in another, so it will be necessary to note occasional caveats.

There are three major areas in which the Latin American military meets the criteria outlined above. The first is when the military participates as a political promoter of reform. This is an active role that must be consciously sought by the organization. The second area is less a conscious choice and more a result of the inherent functions of the military in developing societies. It concerns the military as a source of modernizing attitudes, especially for conscripts from backward environments. Finally, the military contributes to development as a unique repository of skills and services that can be exploited in essentially nonmilitary tasks for the good of the nation.

military as a political promoter of reform

The Latin American armed forces, like the societies they represent, are changing. It is no longer accurate to think of all the Latin American military as a partner of the church and wealthy landowners in favor of the status quo. There are several good explanations for the change, which of course has not been of uniform importance throughout the continent. In

the first place, recruiting for the officer corps has shifted from the upper to the middle and lower classes. These officers, mostly younger and of lower rank, reflect their background in their increased concern for the condition of the wider segments of their society.[3] In addition, the armed forces of many nations have recognized a potential powder keg in social conditions that lend themselves to violent revolution. Revolutions of the explosive type experienced in Mexico in 1910–17 and Bolivia in 1952 destroy the established armed forces, so the military has a vested interest in satisfying pressures that threaten their existence. Also, and a related point, the armed forces recognize that national military power depends on the health of the national party as a whole; a strong economic system and a strong sense of national unity are prerequisites to a viable national defense. For several reasons, then, the military may take a political position in favor of meeting the challenges of development.

Achieving the conditions for change. The state cannot take measures against any of the pressures that beset it unless it operates in a reasonably stable situation. The military in Latin America is an important factor in achieving the required stability. While its participation may involve purely military tasks, such as counterinsurgency, it may also involve political action.

Venezuela provides an example of the military in this role. In 1958 the government of Perez Jimenez was being rocked by extensive civil disorder. The reaction of the government was to increase its repressive measures, and this, in turn, resulted in greater reaction and violence. In two days of fighting in January, over 300 people were killed and 1000 wounded. The military, fearing chaos, demanded and received the president's resignation. That same year Romulo Betancourt was elected president in the first free election in ten years. The military had acted as a caretaker of the national interest and withdrew when stability was restored. In Latin America, where instability is frequently endemic, this role is particularly important.

The danger here, of course, is that military intervention may, in fact, promote the very instability it seeks to control. The disruptive effects of political interference, some of which may affect the political system long after the event, are of such dimensions that the alternative must be dire indeed. Obviously there are no standards that determine the relative payoffs of passivity and action in conditions of internal conflict, but it is important to note that in some circumstances the alternative to military pressure might be monumental chaos.[4]

Extension of the national political power base. The challenge of participation is a crucial one. If segments of the national entity seek influence in decision-making but are frustrated, the conditions for an upheaval exist. The military has, on various occasions, had a hand in expanding the political power base and easing such pressures. In Argentina, for example, the military, when led by Juan Domingo Perón, allied itself with labor, previously a sizable force without significant influence. Whatever else Perón may have done in Argentina, he and his uniformed colleagues brought the working classes into the political system, and no political equation since has been complete without them.[5]

There are also examples of the military's cooperating to remove roadblocks standing in the way of increased participation. These roadblocks have included fellow officers as well as civilians. Professor Edwin Lieuwen has conceded that ". . . they often played an anti-despotic political role, intervening to terminate the impossible tyranny of one of their own errant colleagues or to supply a corrective to the excesses of civilian politicians."[6]

A potential problem in this role is that, once having associated itself with one aspiring group, the military might stick with it to the frustration of yet other groups. Some observers contend that this has already happened

generally throughout Latin America, where the middle class is allied with the military against the lower classes.[7] However, even if true, it is only fair to point out that this situation is vulnerable to change just as was the earlier alliance with the oligarchy. Some evidence, in fact, suggests that it is changing, and doing so rapidly, as military men become increasingly sensitive to pressures from the long-denied lower sectors.

The modernizing military. Of tremendous importance to Latin America has been the relatively recent emergence of socially conscious, politically aggressive armed forces referred to as the "modernizing military." The modernizing military typically rides to power on a theme of virulent nationalism, believing itself to be the only force capable of implementing and directing a program of vast reform. Agrarian reform, more equitable tax structures, nationalization of basic industries, economic assistance to the underprivileged, and national job-training programs are some of the ideas espoused by the modernizing military.

The importance of nationalism to this kind of military regime cannot be overestimated. Nationalism provides basic motivation for the military and the whole population; it is the glue that holds together the previously separate sectors of the system. It is the rationale for almost everything the modernizing military does. The rising sense of national pride throughout Latin America may indicate that conditions conducive to the modernizing military are becoming widespread.

Although most Latin American armed forces, whether they are in political power or not, have modernizing elements, the most obvious recent example of this phenomenon is found in Peru. The revolution in 1968 brought to power what now appears to be a textbook case of the modernizing military. For whatever motives, the regime appears sincerely dedicated to meeting the crises of development in a forceful and, above all, independent fashion. This has created friction between Peru and the U.S. over expropriation and the limits of territorial water, but on the other hand some powerful changes have been made for the Peruvian people. One careful observer recently listed these accomplishments: ". . . the breaking of the oligarchy's stranglehold on the economy; the distribution of hacienda lands to those who work them; the discrediting of the traditional, self-serving political system; the reform of the educational, judicial, and university systems; and the inculcation in the public of at least a degree of social consciousness. . . ."[8] The military in this role is attempting to meet the challenges of nation-building, participation, and distribution simultaneously.

A most important reservation about this role concerns the ability of the military to see the job to completion. Historically, when reform-minded military men have assumed power, their worst enemies have been their colleagues in uniform. Different perceptions of military responsibilities and roles within the armed forces have led to reversals, iniquitous compromises, and countervailing pressures that dilute the value of the original program.

Before passing to the second general area of positive roles, we should note that the modernizing military, while it favors change, will not condone free-wheeling, cataclysmic change of a violently revolutionary nature. It believes firmly in controlled change at a pace the military can manipulate. Its faith in the necessity for stability shapes this requirement. Any attempt to bring on a violent revolution, even if the military shared some of its ultimate goals, would be met with force.

military as a source of modernizing attitudes

Some positive roles of the Latin American military are inherent in the business of running a defense establishment. They are spin-off benefits of the training that naturally comes with armed forces in a developing nation. For

the most part these roles develop attitudes concerning the individual's political competence and his obligation to the nation, attitudes which are essential to the processes of development.

National unity. The military by its very nature and mission is a strong national symbol. It possesses an effective set of emblems (uniforms, weapons, flags, etc.), which represents national authority. It frequently is the most nationally dedicated element in the society, claiming no parochial view within its ranks. It instills in its recruits an awareness of the nation which in many cases was not present before recruitment, and it exposes its members to other segments of society—men from other areas with different views and backgrounds—and contributes in this way to national integration.

The military in some cases is the only observable national symbol. In the jungles of Brazil, for instance, the Brazilian Air Force frequently provides the only contact the people there ever have with the national government. Both as a symbol and extension of state authority and as a unifying force with its conscripts, the military performs an important service.

Teaching pragmatism. For recruits who enter military service from traditional segments of society, their tour of duty provides exposure to attitudes that are prerequisites to the problem-solving involved in development. A recruit from a rural background brings with him a narrow view of human capability. He is impressed by the power of the supernatural and consequently accepts his lot with little question. The military exposes him, under controlled conditions and with more security than is normally available in this process, to secular, pragmatic thought and to man's potential as a result of it. The requirement for training in twentieth century military skills promotes an objective and empirical approach, subordinating the mysticism and fatalism of his upbringing. The military organi-

zation of today is by its very nature, then, a source of socialization that inculcates the kinds of beliefs that a developing nation must have in abundance. A broader and common cultural experience of this type sets conditions that are necessary for nation-building and for effective participation in the political process.[9]

Social mobility. The military in Latin America has for some years been an acceptable avenue of advancement for men of the middle and lower classes. In some societies, the armed forces constitute one of only a few such opportunities. An officer's commission puts him in the middle or upper middle class economically regardless of his background and also introduces him to high social and political circles perhaps not previously open to him.

Social mobility in the military encourages the aggressive, problem-solving attitudes that are necessary in meeting the challenges of development. It promotes participation and acts as a safety valve for individuals who seek a part in the national commitment. Access to the respect, authority, and responsibility attendant to the profession induces otherwise lethargic members of society to become an active part of it. Further, status fluidity helps to get the best available talent with the best attitudes where they can be most effective.

The Mexican armed forces provide a good example of the military opportunity for mobility. The tradition of an open officer corps, which had its roots in the revolution of 1910–17, continues today; many Mexican officers are the products of families in the lower income levels. A more specific example is the recent president of Peru, General Juan Velasco Alvarado, who began his career as an enlisted man and advanced to the officer corps by appointment to the Peruvian military academy.

The biggest drawback to all three of these modernizing attitude roles is that they apply to so small a part of the population. The largest military establishments in Latin America hold no more than one percent of the

total population. Consequently, although the military may perform a positive role for those who become a part of it, relatively few people are affected. In addition, as Latin American societies progress, other agencies assume a much greater share of the responsibility for modernizing attitudes; schools and communications media are prime examples. Many other avenues for mobility also open up as the nation becomes more diverse and fluid. On the whole, the more advanced economically and socially a nation is, the less significant is this set of roles.

military as a provider of skills and services

The first set of roles centered around activities of the military that are largely political. The second set dealt primarily with positive social or cultural roles. The third set will involve functions that are preponderantly economic. This category includes (1) skills that the military provides to its members by virtue of its inherent technological requirements, and (2) both skills and services furnished by the military to society beyond its military tasks.

Inherent skills. The modern military organization requires a vast number of specialties that have wide applicability in civilian life. This requires extensive training, and much of it is founded in educational fields of broad utility, e.g., reading, writing, mathematics, and basic physics. Because a recruit must be able to read before he can be expected to learn how to maintain an aircraft engine, most Latin American armed forces conduct literacy training for those recruits who need it. Next comes skill training for tasks vital to the military mission, such as accounting, administration, carpentry, metal work, food preparation, law enforcement, procurement, and sanitation. The training for all these jobs can be productive in meeting the requirements of an expanding economy. It also equips the member to achieve his goal of a better income after leaving the service.

Skills and services. There is another dimension to this set of roles which is potentially much more significant than the first. It results when the military devotes its manpower and resources to solving the problems of development. This role is more commonly known as civic action.[10]

There are two compelling motivations for civic action. In the first, unfortunate social and economic conditions in parts of Latin America persuade civilian and military authorities that the military must join the developmental struggle, since all elements of the national life must be productive. Most armed forces in Latin America have no apparent serious international threat to prepare for. At the same time they do have equipment and manpower that can usefully be turned to programs that either cannot or will not be accomplished by the civilian sectors.

The second and more immediate motivation is the result of the existence or imminent threat of insurgency. In addition to their military activities, the armed forces engage in civic action in order to gain the allegiance and cooperation of the population in the area of dispute. Without the support of the local people an insurgent group is in serious danger. The military, as representatives of the national government, simply undertake tasks, usually short-range, that are designed to win loyalty in the area away from the insurgents and toward the government.

Whatever the motivation, the range of projects is impressive. Virtually all Latin American armed forces now participate in some form of civic action, and several had long and admirable histories of such activity well before civic action came to be emphasized in the 1960s.

A complete list of civic action projects in Latin America would be an enormous undertaking. However, several examples will serve to illustrate the kinds of things being done.
• In Peru, the last three months of many conscripts' two-year service are spent in voca-

tional training. Five schools were built by the army for this purpose, and 25 civilian trades are taught. In 1968, 4500 military men went through this program, and it has been expanding since. • In Brazil the Air Force logs about 1000 hours a month on civic action missions and additionally maintains service for passengers, mail, food, and supplies on routes that are unprofitable for civilian aviation. The Brazilian army is engaged in an ambitious program of road and railway construction, primarily in the less accessible parts of the nation. • In Guatemala the army operates a press for making adobe and cement blocks, then transports them to building sites, where servicemen help in the construction of schools, dispensaries, housing, etc. The Guatemalan army built the first road from the jungle city of El Petén to Guatemala City, thus opening up valuable hardwood and chicle resources in the north. • In the Andean countries the armed forces have been engaged in overcoming the mountain barrier by building roads through it and flying over it. • In Bolivia and Peru the armed forces have been enlisted in an effort to colonize the rich eastern slopes of the mountains. The Bolivian army is building roads in the area and supplying cadres of specialists to assist the early settlers. The army is even prospecting for mineral deposits in the hope that colonization will be more attractive and profitable.

There are many examples, some spectacular, some not so spectacular, but these few indicate the scope of the role. The economic fruits are important, for they raise the general distributive capability of the nation. At the same time the military demonstrates its interest in uniting the nation and in supporting national goals. Civic action in one form or another addresses all four of the challenges of development, but it contributes the most to meeting the crises of nation-building and distribution.[11]

NOT EVEN members of the armed forces of Latin America would contend that all the efforts of their predecessors or contemporaries can be judged as positive. Nor is it the intention of this brief survey to contend that the military stands entirely pure and untarnished. What it does contend is that old notions about the negative nature of the armed forces in Latin America are inaccurate. Instead, the military, which after all is an integral factor in most Latin American countries, responds positively to the imperatives of national development. It can, in fact, be seen to perform a variety of roles which are beneficial in that process.

Sufficient objections to these roles have been raised so that it should be apparent that a very careful analysis must be made to determine the potential value of specific cases. Each situation must be weighed in terms of payoffs versus sacrifices, possible damage to other facets of the developmental effort, extent of national stability, availability and competence of civilian alternatives, the question of which challenges are most pressing, and the existence of international threats. What is more, these considerations must be weighed individually within each country on the basis of its specific context, independent of outside interference. Given these conditions, there is much for the military to do that can help to overcome the monumental difficulties most Latin American nations face.

Air Command and Staff College

Notes

1. Nelson A. Rockefeller, *The Rockefeller Report on the Americas* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969).
2. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 35–37, 314–32.
3. John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America*

(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 106–13.

4. See, for instance, the assessment of Vernon Lee Fluharty, *Dance of the Millions: Military Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia, 1930–1956* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957), pp. 316–17.

5. Frederick B. Pike, ed., *Freedom and Reform in Latin America* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 57.

6. Edwin Lieuwen, "Militarism and Politics in Latin America," in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries,* ed., John J. Johnson (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 149.

7. See José Nun, "The Middle-Class Military Coup," in *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America,* ed., Claudio Veliz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 66–118. Also Veliz in the same work, pp. 1–14.

8. Richard Lee Clinton, "The Modernizing Military: The Case of Peru," *Inter-American Economic Affairs,* XXIV (Spring 1971), pp. 43–66.

9. See Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, op. cit.*

10. Two excellent and thorough works on civic action are Edward Bernard Glick, *Peaceful Conflict: The Nonmilitary Use of the Military* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1967); and Hugh Hanning, *The Peaceful Uses of Military Forces* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967).

11. Another appraisal of civic action can be found in Willard F. Barber and Neale Ronning, *Internal Security and Military Power* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966).

AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW AWARDS PROGRAM

Lieutenant Colonel Earl W. Renfroe, Jr., USAF, has been selected by the Air University Review Awards Committee to receive the annual award for writing the outstanding article to appear in the *Review* during fiscal year 1972. His article, "The Commander and the Minority Mental Process," was previously designated the outstanding article in the November-December 1971 issue.

The awards program provides payment to eligible authors, a $50 award for the outstanding article in each issue, and a $200 savings bond for the annual outstanding article. The award winners also receive a plaque.

The bimonthly winners for the past year were Brigadier General Noel F. Parrish, USAF (Ret), "The Civilian Analysts, in Their Pride and Their Fall," July-August 1971; Colonel Arthur R. Moore, Jr., USAF, "Squadron Officer School, Junior Officers, and You," September-October 1971; Lieutenant Colonel Earl W. Renfroe, Jr., USAF, "The Commander and the Minority Mental Process," November-December 1971; Colonel Albert P. Sights, Jr., USAF (Ret), "Strategic Bombing and Changing Times," January-February 1972; Major General Robert N. Ginsburgh, USAF, and Major Edd D. Wheeler, USAF, "The Evolution of Air Warfare," March-April 1972; Herman S. Wolk, "Antimilitarism in America," May-June 1972.

Air Force Review

USAF AREA SPECIALIST PROGRAM

Major James S. Austin, Jr.   Major Jimmy Mitchell

IN the years following its establishment as a separate service, the Air Force was preoccupied with the development of an advanced technology and the hardware to counter a very real and capable enemy. Through the late 1940s and the 1950s, the drive for military technological superiority eclipsed any need the Air Force might have had for sophistication or advanced training in military sociopolitical affairs. This trend was given further impetus by the 1957 launching of Sputnik I and the subsequent development of intercontinental ballistic missile systems by the United States.

By the mid-1960s, there had developed an increasing awareness of the importance of the "human" element, both within the Air Force and in its external relations. Internally, members of the Air Force were requesting a bit more understanding, the elimination of irritants, and a "humanizing" of policies and procedures. The late 1960s saw the generation and development of Air Force "people" awareness in our official personnel policies and in our Special Operations, Intelligence, and Military Assistance programs. The Officer Career Development Program, Airman Career Advisory programs, Human Relations programs, TOPLINE, etc., are all indicative of this growing awareness that the individual human being is a key to success of the Air Force mission.

In overseas areas, a number of incidents and misunderstandings led to recognition of the need to understand the attitudes and beliefs of the people of other countries. The Air Force was sometimes caught in the situation where years of carefully cultivated relations were suddenly lost because of the behavior or attitudes of one or two Air Force members. Officials of other nations did not always understand or deal with us by *our* standards or on *our* terms.

Conversely, those military officers who were effective and respected overseas were highly visible. The most effective usually proved to be senior officers who knew the language and the customs of the country: a Marine colonel in Morocco who spoke fluent Arabic, an Army attaché in the Far East who spoke Chinese, a Navy captain who could deal with his NATO counterpart in his own language during joint Mediterranean maneuvers. All too frequently these exceptional officers were from the other services.

Awareness of these human understanding problems overseas has come at the same time the Air Force has been developing its internal "people" programs. While the internal programs have been subject to considerable publicity, a program to cope with some of our international understanding problems has been quietly evolving. The USAF Area Specialist Program (ASP) develops area specialists who can combine an understanding of a foreign language with a comprehensive knowledge of the culture, government, economics, and geography of an overseas area. The program is maturing into an integrated procurement, training, and utilization system for highly selected area specialists. Only by understanding people on their own terms can we become really effective in dealing with them and in communicating our beliefs and ideals to them.

history of the program

The Air Force need for officers trained in the language and culture of other areas of the world has been talked about for a number of years. It was formally recognized as early as 1965 in the reports and recommendations of the Air Force Educational Requirements Board.[1] In 1967 the need for such a training program was stressed in correspondence from a number of AF commands and agencies to the Air Staff. As a result of the interest expressed, an Air Force-wide meeting was convened by the Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel at the Pentagon in May 1968.[2] At this meeting, interested Air Force agencies reviewed the Army Foreign Area Specialist Training

(FAST) Program and discussed what kind of program would best meet the unique needs of the Air Force. In addition, Air Staff representatives briefed participants on current and anticipated Air Force personnel plans and the relationship of the committee's work to such guidance.[3] Research tasks were assigned to all conference participants to prepare for a follow-on conference.

When the ad hoc committee met again in May 1969, it was treated to an exceptional keynote address by Brigadier General Robert L. Cardenas, who was then Commander, USAF Special Operations Force. General Cardenas challenged the conferees to think beyond traditional area study and to have both breadth and depth in the proposed AF program. He said, in part:

> Since Korea, we have seen the pattern of warfare evolve which requires the military officer to have a deeper and broader understanding of the political aspects of conflict in addition to being an expert in the employment of an increasingly complex array of fighting hardware. We have also seen the requirement for this political-military understanding reach down from what was formerly a general officer's exclusive province to be essential in the effective performance of duty by a junior officer and often an NCO. The individual, military or civilian, serving in areas of conflict today who does not understand the environment in which he is working can, many times, cause infinitely more harm than he can do good, however well intentioned are his efforts.

In speaking of what an area specialist should be, General Cardenas stated:

> Unequivocally, the USAF foreign area specialist must be first and foremost qualified in his Air Force specialty.
>
> The second qualification I think our area specialist should have is the right attitude. We have to select people who have a genuine interest, not only in the area, but the people in the area where he is going to serve.
>
> . . . a third qualification is to have our

candidate area-oriented. We will have to begin this process before we are sure about the potential candidate's capability to fulfill the first two qualifications. I think this only serves to point up the need for a broad base of potential area specialists and the need to be extremely discriminating in our final selection process.[4]

This concept of the Area Specialist Program was readily accepted by the conference, and the three qualifications outlined by General Cardenas have become the key operational concepts of the program.

The May 1969 meeting concluded without resolving some of the problem areas, such as personnel identification and coding, selection procedures, language training, etc. Tasks were again assigned, and a third meeting of the committee was scheduled for the fall of 1969.[5]

This conference was held at the USAF Academy in November 1969. The meeting place was most appropriate, since the Academy had recently developed area specialty majors in its curriculum and had a number of qualified area specialists on its faculty. At this meeting, participants agreed on several general operating concepts for the program, including a stress on technical skills, language training, and career flexibility. The conference entertained a number of suggestions for a name for the program; the one agreed upon was simple: the USAF Area Specialist Program. The conference concluded that there would be several possible avenues into the program: by prior education, by in-country experience, or through Air Force-sponsored graduate educational programs. The committee reviewed and modified a draft of an Air Force regulation concerning the program. Language training and its phasing with an educational program were discussed but not completely resolved. The matter of AF-wide requirements for area specialists was dealt with at length, and the committee concluded that work must go forward on identifying specific duty positions as requiring area specialist officers.[6]

The ad hoc committee adjourned without the expectation of further meetings. The ball passed, so to speak, to responsible Hq USAF agencies to work through the remaining problems and publish a comprehensive Air Force regulation to formally establish the program, which is being staffed now and tentatively identified as AFR 36-16.

Concurrent with the initial area specialist conference, the Air Force educational process began to include area specialist educational programs in the annual Air Force Institute of Technology programs.[7] For the fiscal years 70, 71, and 72, these programs have represented the bulk of social science quotas in the AFIT program, with input into Intelligence, OSI, Special Operations, and Psychological Warfare career areas and a few quotas forecasted in Education, Security Police, Military Assistance, and Plans and Policy.[8]

As a result of a joint Hq USAF, AU, AFIT, and AFMPC meeting held in February 1971 at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, a new coding system was implemented through appropriate changes to AFM's 36-1, 50-5, and 300-4. Now each area specialist officer will have an "L" prefix to his authorized input Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC). He will also have a three-digit special experience identifier (SEI) corresponding to his area of specialization. The geographic areas which can be identified in this system are as follows:

AREA	SEI
Western Europe	435
Eastern Europe	436
Soviet Union	437
North Africa	438
Sub-Sahara	439
Middle East	440
South Asia	441
Mediterranean	442
Southeast Asia	443
Caribbean	444
Latin America	445
Far East	446

This coding system has as its prime objective the proper identification for career assignment utilization of these uniquely qualified resources.

AFIT programs

Basically, the academic program for area specialists incorporates a master's degree with interdisciplinary course work and language training. Depending on prior language proficiency and particular country or area for which instruction is desired, a selectee's program will average fifteen to eighteen months. A person who has an adequate grasp of the area language can normally complete his academic program in twelve months. One who has no prior language capability and will need conversational proficiency in an Asian tongue may need a longer program.

The formal academic program for a selectee may be in the area (as an M.A. in Latin American Studies) or in a specific academic subject matter with an area emphasis. Academic subject areas include political science, history, language, cultural geography, international economics, and anthropology.

Determination as to specific program emphasis is influenced by the major academic field (MAF) code for which the officer is identified, his undergraduate background, his present language capability, and the specific requirements of the assignment, if known. These factors interact in each case to determine an optimum program that will qualify the individual in minimum time.

The civilian school (as well as the department) to be attended is a crucial factor in the Area Specialist Program. Once a country or region is identified for a selectee and a language specified, research must be initiated to find an academic institution that (1) will accept the officer, (2) has a meaningful program to meet the specific USAF area specialist requirements, and (3) can schedule courses to permit completion in a realistic but meaningful time frame.

Many universities and colleges have established programs in Latin American Studies, Western European Studies, African Studies, East European/Soviet Studies, Mid-Eastern Studies, Asian (South, East, Southeast) Studies, but some may lack the specific foreign language, dialect, or conversational emphasis needed to prepare an area specialist officer. In that event, attendance at the Defense Language Institute at the Presidio of Monterey, California, or Washington, D.C., may be essential after completion of formal course work at the university. Meaningful programs can be developed in schools not hosting such area specialist programs, per se, through a liberal interdepartmental policy allowing a selectee to major in one department for degree attainment and enrich his area emphasis by taking interdisciplinary courses and language exposure in associated departments.

Both approaches are currently being employed by AFIT, and an evaluation of the effectiveness of a given institution's preparation is periodically undertaken to provide AFIT with valid management data to plan for future training.

Schools currently used by Air Force students with particular area emphasis include

    University of Alabama—Latin America
    University of Arizona—Asia, Latin
      America
    University of Denver—Middle East
    Florida State University—Asia, Latin
      America, West/East Europe, Soviet
      Union
    Indiana University—Soviet Union,
      Europe
    Michigan State University—Europe,
      Africa, Latin America
    University of Michigan—Asia, Europe
    University of Notre Dame—Europe,
      Soviet Union, Latin America, Africa
    Oklahoma State University—Latin
      America
    San Diego State College—Asia, Latin
      America

    Saint Mary's University—Latin America
    Stanford University—Asia
    University of Texas—Latin America
    Washington State University—Europe
    University of Washington—Asia

Obviously, some schools, either because of facilities available, number of faculty assigned, or program longevity, offer better developed area specialist programs than others. AFIT's task is to match selected officers with interested, capable schools that will work with the student and with AFIT to prepare the man properly. Only by working together in this way can we develop qualified area specialists who will be truly effective representatives of the United States Air Force in overseas areas.

assignments

The Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG), the air attaché system, U.S. embassies having USAF representation, the USAF Special Air Warfare School, Special Operations Force, the intelligence community (AF/IN, DIA), and the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) are the prime users of officers receiving area specialist training. Other assignments for area specialists include duty with overseas commands (PACAF, USAFE, etc.); academic programs, as at Air Force Academy, Inter-American Academy; government agencies such as Department of State; Air Staff; and other special positions.

Proper communication between AFIT, the USAF Military Personnel Center, and these users can result in placing the right man with the required training in the specific country or area needing his particular background and experience. In this respect, perhaps the most effective coordination to date has been that evidenced with the selectees for the Office of Special Investigations.

Fulfilling USAF area specialist requirements and satisfying particular needs with regard to specific end assignments can be illustrated by the following example.

An officer nominated by OSI has been selected for the AFIT-sponsored Middle East area specialist program by AFMPC and has been tagged by OSI for subsequent assignment to Turkey. OSI makes this tentative end assignment known to AFIT and the requirement that the officer possess R-3, S-3 proficiency in the Turkish language. Civilian Institutions (AFIT/CI), after reviewing the officer's records and the programs of a number of schools, submits this officer's academic credentials to the University of Utah. He is found to be academically acceptable for admission by the university and is subsequently enrolled in the Middle East Center under the direction of Dr. Khosrow Mostofi. The eighteen-month program gives him thorough course work, directed reading, and research on the Turkish culture, and includes language exposure through the intermediate level.

Since he was already fully qualified in his technical specialty, the officer will be assigned, upon graduation, to an OSI office in Turkey for direct and immediate utilization of his training.

A specific need is being satisfied for a particular user in support of an established Air Force requirement. That officer's effectiveness in-country will reflect how well the system has worked.

Hopefully, the end product will be a better informed and more receptive USAF officer in that area of concern: an Air Force officer whose overall capability and area knowledge have been to a great degree enhanced by education provided through the Area Specialist Program.

As a result of the success of the model OSI Area Specialist Program, AFM 50–5, *USAF Formal Schools Catalog*, now requires an individual desiring to enter the Area Specialist Program to obtain a sponsoring agency such as Intelligence, Special Operations, Military Assistance, Plans and Policy, or OSI. The sponsoring agency will try to assure utilization in a specific end assignment before asking AFIT to evaluate an applicant academically.[9]

The Civilian Institutions Program manager for ASP then assists AFIT admissions in determining if the applicant is eligible for a particular area program and how long such an interdisciplinary/cross-cultural program should take. The sponsoring agency will then be informed of this evaluation, and any subsequent adjustment in programming can be made prior to the applicant's military screening by the AF Military Personnel Center. Once selected, the officer can then be educated against a specific country/area assignment instead of merely against a generalized quota, as had been the case prior to FY 1972.

Officers educated through this system are already on assignments in a number of overseas areas, and the number will grow with the FY 1972 graduates. It is too early now for the Air Force to measure the value of such training in terms of increased effectiveness or measurable improvements in our international relations.

In this article we have stressed the academic phase of the program since it is presently the most visible portion of the system. However, the Air Force has many individuals who by prior education or experience are already well qualified to be designated as area specialists —those who have gained their knowledge and language firsthand. Formal identification of some of these individuals was completed in late 1971 under Change 5, AFM 36–1, *Officer Classification Manual*.

A key problem remains in identifying those positions in the Air Force which need the services of an area specialist and verifying the language and other qualifications required. This work is proceeding but requires very careful review to insure that the area specialists will be properly utilized.

THE RATE of progress in the overall development of this program can best be described as "deliberate." It has gone from a recommenda-

tion in 1965 to a fully staffed proposal in 1970. Some of the most difficult problems, those of coding and identification within the Air Force personnel system, were finally resolved in 1971. Today, its academic phase is a reality, with students studying in a number of major universities and the first graduates already in the field. We expect that the care and deliberation with which the program has been developed will pay large dividends in the future. As General Cardenas said in closing his address to the 1969 conference:

> I think we have a great opportunity in the development of our Area Specialist Program to take advantage of the lessons we and other services and agencies have learned worldwide. If we use this opportunity wisely, I'm sure we can develop individuals who can make significant contributions to the USAF and the U.S. government capabilities to cope with international problems.[10]

Air Force Institute of Technology

Notes

1. Air Force Educational Requirements Board, Panel Report of Qualitative Educational Requirements for the Security Career Area, April 1965.

2. AFPDPRO letter, undated, Foreign Area Specialist Training (FAST).

3. Hq USAF, Directorate of Personnel Planning, DCS/Personnel, Foreign Area Specialist Training Program, undated.

4. Brigadier General Robert L. Cardenas, Keynote Speech, Foreign Area Specialist Conference, May 1969, USAF Academy.

5. Minutes—May 1969 Conference.

6. Minutes—November 1969 Conference.

7. FY 1969 AFIT program, AFPDPRO.

8. FY 1970—FY 1971 AFIT Programs, AFPDPRO.

9. AFIT section of AFM 50–5, *USAF Formal School Catalog*, 1 July 1971 (para 5c(6), page 3–AFIT–5).

10. Brigadier General Robert L. Cardenas, *op. cit.*

In My Opinion

WHO'S LISTENING? WHO'S TALKING?

Colonel William R. Edgar

IF THERE is one thing that makes a professional Information Officer grit his teeth and cringe, it is to be called an "ISO" or, even worse, "PRO" or "PIO." Those abbreviations stand for what used to be the Information Officer's equivalent a long time ago. (We have not been Public Information Officers for a full generation.) The old terminology is objectionable not because we are sensitive or finicky but because the offender seems to be thinking we are still performing the same functions as the PRO of World War II.

To say the least, the ball game has changed. The truth is, the Information Officer's job goes far beyond getting the news media work done. It also encompasses community relations and internal information — indeed, relations with

people of all kinds, both inside and outside the organization. The IO doesn't do all this communicating himself, of course, for that would be beyond human capacity; since we are all communicating all the time, every one of us in a blue uniform is a communicator.

Information is not only a tool of management, as we often hear; it is the very function of management itself. It is implicit in every policy decision and every action. It is not a function that can be contained within a limited category as something that is the IO's job and no one else's.

Calling the Information Officer the "PIO" leads into a semantic trap. Public information (only a fraction of the IO's job) consists of efforts to communicate with the general public via the mass media—press, radio, and television. Mass media are important, certainly, but they cannot be relied upon to carry the Air Force story to the public all by themselves.

Mass communications do have certain inherent advantages, chiefly in that large numbers of people can be reached economically. But there are disadvantages as well. We in the Air Force do not run the mass media. We can submit a story or a story idea, but the mass media control its acceptance and how it is used. Furthermore, media use of a story does not guarantee that every reader (or viewer) will see and digest the information.

In addition, all the mass media constitute a "buyer's market." There are more stories competing for attention than can possibly be used. I had a talk not long ago with one of the news executives of one of the major television networks. He said that most Air Force stories are simply "too bland and unexciting to rate even a minute or two of precious network time."

But there is one kind of Air Force news that seems to make the grade these days— bad news. We have all seen the many prominent national news stories about scandals and mismanagement, corruption and atrocities in the military services. There's a good reason

why this kind of news gets exposure: quite simply, it's exciting, and exciting news is what sells newspapers and gets good audience ratings. At least for the foreseeable future, we must live with the fact that the mass media will tend to be more willing to use bad news about the military than good news.

Compare this communication situation with that of a well-informed public speaker before a group of concerned civilians. He has their undivided attention; he does not run the risk that they will get up and go to the icebox for a beer. In short, public speaking provides eyeball contact between our spokesman and large numbers of people, a kind of communication unattainable in any other way.

The responsibility does not belong to the Information Officer alone. Air Force Manual 190–4 pointedly states:

> It is incumbent upon general and senior officers to avail themselves of *every* practical opportunity to speak and otherwise officially represent the Air Force before reputable groups. (Italics added.)

This responsibility, sometimes ignored, is more important today than ever before. What we need to achieve is public understanding of the Air Force mission and the tools we will need to accomplish that job. It is in the public interest to do so.

When a responsible spokesman stands up to deliver the facts, he should underscore the point that specialized Air Force interests and the public interest *do* coincide. One of the central truths of the modern world is that government is growing larger, more complex, and harder to understand. Certainly the military, despite recent large cutbacks, has undergone a general trend of increasing size and complexity. The inevitable result of this trend, unless steps are taken to counteract it, is that people will feel more and more remote from the government. And, unless we do something about it, we will become more and more remote from the people.

The tendency toward remoteness can be deadly at a time when public opinion is more powerful than at any other period in American history. What people cannot understand, they will mistrust. When the concerned citizen cannot find out to his satisfaction what the military is up to, he will tend to believe the worst. Much of the recent criticism of the military in the United States is a direct result of this tendency.

Too often, an officer who would seemingly be a good spokesman gives the appearance of giving a speech only after he's finally been trapped and there is no escape. This may fill the proverbial square, but it doesn't contribute to communication. Especially in these days when a civilian group is likely to adopt a questioning attitude toward whatever we have to say, it is vital that each officer prepare well for every speech he makes, with the goal of making a real contribution to the audience's understanding and appreciation of the Air Force role. We all lose when a spokesman fails to make this contribution, either by boring or alienating the group—or by missing the opportunity completely.

A constant problem is the speaker's aptitude in the public arena. The need still exists not to neglect the art of speechmaking! The objective is to communicate our military capabilities and requirements without the cynicism of damning those who oppose or the arrogance of threatening national catastrophe if our needs are not met. Excellent speech material is available in the Aerospace Speech Series, and every general officer should be required to have a 15-minute speech written, approved by Security Review, and ready for presentation with minimum updating. "Have the word —want to be heard" then becomes the byword, and the local IO arranges the appearance. A short, succinct, sincerely delivered speech establishes the background for audience questions, from which emerges public opinion. Direct responses to questions about the Air Force, consistent with security requirements,

establish credibility. The speaker must be willing and prepared to answer all questions directly and forthrightly. President Nixon put it this way in his address to the nation on 3 November 1969:

> I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

The American people welcome dialogue and have traditionally listened to viewpoints. We must zealously guard against perpetrating pious platitudes; only facts must be used, and they must be framed by a well-briefed awareness by the speaker of Air Force requirements. The need for the public to know the facts has never been greater, and the obligation to tell it like it is has never been more pressing. We cannot, in good conscience, blame the public for their lack of understanding.

And no matter how much we may seek scapegoats in the press or on TV, in the Congress or on the university campuses, there is finally one inescapable explanation for this lack of understanding. We do not need to look far to find who is remiss.

The time for self-delusion is past. Information Officers all over the Air Force keep track of and file reports on the speeches and public appearances made by generals and other senior officers. A casual look at the reports would seem to show speech after speech lulling us into the comfortable notion that we are truly communicating. But a second look shows that our spokesmen are speaking almost exclusively to audiences composed of Air Force officers, dependents, Air Force Association members, military students, aerospace industry officials, and others who already understand and accept our point of view. *We are not talking to the public; we are talking only to ourselves.* We are not confronting; we are

consoling! The question which arises is not only who is or is not talking but who is listening?

The audiences made up of friends and members of the Air Force are important; we should not ignore them. But we should not delude ourselves that speaking only to them fulfills our responsibility to speak to the public —no matter how many squares it may fill in the official report of the Air Force Speakers' Program. We are copping out on a responsibility to communicate with people who have no Air Force connection, because those are precisely the ones we need most to reach.

I do not think we are afraid of the truth, but I think we act as though we were. The time to hide is not when the going gets rough. That is the time to be up front, to be seen and be heard. If a visitor from another planet should come to observe what we are doing, he could only conclude that we were cursed with an obsessive death wish—like the mythical lizard that ate its own tail until nothing remained.

To be practical, we all know that even when a senior officer is motivated to speak, he may have difficulty finding the right platform. But help is available for each Air Force speaker from his Information Officer. Getting the right speaker and the right audience together is one of the functions of the IO.

Let's face a fact of life: If Air Force spokesmen continue to ignore the audiences and publics that lack the surety of acceptance, then those segments of our society will form their opinion about us based on what others say. The consequences are clear. Since bad news tends to dominate news coverage, then good news will rarely be adequately reported to the American public according to present practice. Word-of-mouth communication is traditionally the most effective and valuable of all communication techniques. It is time to respond to the people's preference to accept information from a known and respected authoritative source. It is also our best hope that the good news will have equal opportunity to be heard.

It has been said in many ways by the concerned leadership of the Air Force. General William W. Momyer, Commander, Tactical Air Command, put it this way in a letter to his subordinate commanders dealing with public attitudes toward the military:

> A major cause of the problem seems to be a combination of diminishing mutual understanding and blurred communications. . . . It is a problem that we must recognize and do everything possible to solve.

Let me address you, a valued reader, as an individual. There is one spokesman you should develop for the Air Force, and that is you, yourself. No one else in the world can speak as authoritatively as you can about what you are doing for the United States now. The American people welcome the opportunity to be told the facts about how the Air Force is conducting its role in national defense. We must tell our story so as to be responsive to each audience's interests, factual with regard to the subject matter, and in timely recognition of the opportunity. Achieving this will, in my opinion, get us back on the right track to have people start listening when an Air Force representative starts talking.

Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

MILITARY PRINCIPLES AND FLEXIBILITIES

A Responsive Policy for Change

Lieutenant Colonel Russell A. Turner II

WE are on a collision course with change. World cultures are restless, and the hot breath of dissent is seering the moral fabric of nations. The time seems out of joint, and the nihilism expounded by Nietzsche is echoed by today's intellectual avant-garde. This condition of change is producing confrontations and conflict that threaten to destroy our economic structure and cultural value systems.

The imperative character of this world change is permeating all levels of American society. As a subculture of that society, the American military establishment has recently been one of the targets of carping attacks challenging its traditions, customs, and operational needs. Even some military people have joined the vociferous voices of those critics advocating immediate and sweeping changes in our military system.

That change is in process is self-evident. What is not so self-evident is where this change is leading us and how we in the Air Force should respond to it. More important, how will a changing American society affect a future all-volunteer military force?

Numerous in-depth studies have already been made addressing the many cause-and-effect relationships of specific factors influencing our society and the Air Force. However, while these studies are invaluable, they are often recondite and microcosmic in their analysis. What the military needs is a uniform, responsive policy with which to meet the problem of change and guide it through the transition to an all-volunteer force. This policy would recognize certain principles and flexibilities in the military establishment. The principles are essential to the military's purpose, existence, and effectiveness. Although they are influenced by change, they remain essential. The flexibilities support the principles by allowing the military to adopt certain changes that are necessary to maintain or increase its effectiveness as a fighting force. By adopting these changes, the military becomes a more realistic reflection of the society at large.

It is important that the public understand these principles and flexibilities if America's youth are going to support an all-volunteer force. This will not be easy, however, since some Americans have always suspected that the professional soldier and a standing army constitute a threat to political freedom. According to Marcus Cunliffe, the American's concept of the ideal soldier is the civilian who eagerly takes up arms when duty calls, defeats the professional enemy soldiers by his vigor and ingenuity, and then resumes his peacetime occupation when the danger is past.[1] This ambivalence is again manifesting itself today as the nation seeks to substitute a volunteer force for its conscript armies tainted by an unpopular war. Therefore, before discussing the principle and flexibility factors, let us clarify the need for a strong military establishment in the future.

The necessity for the United States to maintain a strong military force for defense against internal and external dangers is an absolute. The present worldwide activism calling for love and human rights does not necessarily signal a mellowing of man's aggressive nature—a fact seemingly not realized by the

activists who believe in the efficacy of demonstrations to produce universal peace. It is no secret that there is a prominent animalistic element in humanity which is prone to violence and conflict. Man is a recalcitrant, insecure organism competing for existence in a hostile world. Aggressive impulses are inevitable in a competitive environment, and the emergence of different world cultures has expanded man's aggressiveness into organized wars. Immanuel Kant wrote: "Peace among men living side by side is not a natural state; natural to them is rather a state of war, if not open hostilities at least the eternal threat of them."[2]

The growing belief today that war is not inevitable belies the fact that war has survived throughout history regardless of changes in social and political systems, in religions, ethics, in intellectual and technical standards. A recent seven-year study of 75 major nations of the world found that internal and external aggression is more than a random occurrence and that the greatest period of frustration (and possible aggression) in a nation is the "mid-awakening," or the period during the middle of the transitional phase between traditional societies and modernity.[3] The population explosion and the rising expectations of the have-not peoples of the world are now, more than ever before, combining to make today and the immediate future a seething cauldron for potential aggression.

Although the decision to switch to an all-volunteer force will be the result of changing values and needs in American society, the need for a strong military establishment will remain unchanged because of man's aggressiveness and the historical fact that all major societies have been strongly oriented to war. Therefore, a lasting peace would require universal fundamental changes in society and man. For the United States unilaterally to make military defense a minor national priority, as some revolutionaries and intellectuals advocate, would be quixotic. Thus, the need remains for the United States to maintain a strong military defense establishment for the foreseeable future.

Now, what are the principles and flexibilities that will aid the United States in maintaining a strong military establishment and help the military respond to the problems of change and transition to an all-volunteer force?

Numerous principles and flexibilities might be identified as inherent in a military establishment. Space, however, permits me to define only a few of the many overlapping sociological, psychological, political, and other factors influencing those principles and flexibilities. Therefore, the purpose of this article is merely to provide an impetus for thought on a conceptual level and a working hypothesis for further consideration.

Inherent in an effective military establishment is the principle of discipline. This principle leans heavily upon the flexibilities for support and is much affected by cultural changes. A great many of the disciplinary and morale problems in the military today can be attributed to the social ills inherited by the military from a changing society, e.g., drug abuse, racial strife, crime, revolutionaries, militants, the Vietnam syndrome, and youthful officers and draftees who are the products of an affluent and permissive environment. Compounding this problem has been the charge that some officers and NCO's do not exercise their lawful responsibility to enforce order and uphold the provisions of policy directives and regulations. In Vietnam, this combination of factors has, on occasion, culminated in physical threats to and the fragging of officers and NCO's.[4] No military organization can function effectively whose leaders have been intimidated or have abdicated their authority through fear or frustration. What have we learned from these circumstances that can be applied to an all-volunteer force?

First, we have learned that authoritarian discipline usually produces only outward conformity while raising inward resentments. Graduating AFROTC students at North Carolina State University were told last year by the guest speaker, Major General Robert N. Ginsburgh, that for "a deeper discipline" a man must know "the reason why."[5] We should adopt this democratic approach to discipline because it provides us the flexibilities of guidance without domination and freedom without laxity. It recognizes that the infinite gradations of human behavior are due mainly to environmental rather than hereditary factors and that this is a basic sociological phenomenon underlying group attitudes which produce tension and conflict. Behavior and attitudes are so interrelated that psychologists cannot agree which is the cause and which is the effect. (It is probably a mixture.) But behavior in any situation is influenced by the individual's anticipations concerning the effects of his actions. Thus, when an individual who violates a group norm does not receive the anticipated group sanctions, the norm is likely to become ineffective. People do not feel right if their misbehavior is persistently overlooked. The principle of discipline then does not tolerate disruptive behavior that intimidates authority. It expects and demands role performances to conform to role requirements and expectations. This means that military group norms—the rules, regulations, policies, and directives—be enforced, not through a martinet application of authority but through a democratic approach to discipline designed to produce an enlightened body of military personnel. The new personnel pamphlet, "Air Force Standards" (AFR 30–1), is a special effort in this direction.

In practicing democratic discipline we must also recognize that there are certain types of individuals who will take advantage of the lenient flexibility and become egocentric and self-assertive. These are the proverbial troublemakers. Perhaps it would be better if the military did not waste its time with these types but discharged them instead. An all-volunteer force affords the military the luxury of being selective, something it could never completely be under the compulsory draft law.

Differential psychology shows that individual differences tend to be quantitative rather than qualitative, a difference in degree rather than in kind. In theory, this means that most men can become soldiers. In practice, however, it means that some people are better off in other professions than in the military. Many of these types of individuals could be identified early through a testing and training period designed for this purpose. If, at the end of this period, the enlistee decides he wants out, or if the military decides he is not the "soldier type," he could be returned to civilian life without stigma. It is wasteful in money and human resources, besides being unrealistic, to expect the military to take just any kind of individual and try to make a soldier, sailor, marine, or airman out of him and then return him to society a better man. The privilege of selectivity, therefore, would free the military of this responsibility and allow it to incorporate only those individuals it could employ effectively. In support of this selective approach, psychological studies show that there are probably no inherently superior or inferior races or ethnic groups as a whole, since man is largely a product of his environment. Thus, society at large must improve the environmental conditions of all its members so that their offspring can benefit during the critical formative phase of their lives.

The regulation of behavior in accordance with the will of the community is a principle of law. This is secured through moral, social, and official sanctions and by law enforcement agencies. The crucial relation between law and social mores has been expressed by Dr. Robert M. Hutchins in the following passage:

> The law is a great teacher. It is . . . the way in which newly discovered moral truth is disseminated among the population and incor-

porated in the conscience and mores of the community. The popular notion that law reflects the mores is, as countless historical examples show, often the reverse of the truth. Law helps make the mores. Law-making is the process by which the members of the political community learn what the mores should be.[6]

The significance of this concept to the military, in the author's opinion, is that since World War II the major egalitarian decisions by the nation's courts have helped to increase differences between the military and civilian segments of our society. These differences have been further compounded by a small portion of the communication media, by a determined onslaught upon our judicial system by militants, and by a public opinion that on occasion appears to support the law violators rather than the legal authorities.

Future enlistees in an all-volunteer force will come from this environment where almost everything is at issue in the war between the young and their elders—from morality, to politics, to love, to personal cleanliness. The assimilation of these young men in the future military could bring increasing confrontations and conflict unless the military acts to maintain a certain minimal adjustment to changing conditions that will insure its survivability as an effective fighting force. If, as Hutchins says, law helps make the mores, then military law can help bridge the civilian-military cultural gap. The principle of law then should protect the military against disintegration from too many and too varied innovators, while at the same time avoiding the suppression of innovators whose ideas represent improvement and benefit. This is the optimum balance between conformity and deviation.

Achieving this optimum balance is perhaps the most urgent psychological problem in the military today. It means the changing of attitudes. Since attitudes are the residuals of our past experiences, they tend to constrict, conserve, and stabilize our worlds. As such, we find security in the status quo and tend to resist change by identifying with people and things that reinforce our preconceived concepts. When we are confronted with the reality of change, we sometimes behave like the emperor in his new clothes.

But the world does change, and man must change with it. The military can ease the transition of change within its ranks by utilizing the flexibilities available to it. Flexibilities are the military's ways and means of narrowing the gap between itself and its parent society. We have already touched on a few of these flexibilities, i.e., a democratic approach to discipline, a testing and training period for enlistees, and the protection that law affords to the innovator. There are myriad other ways in which the flexibilities support the principles. For example, flexibility allows the length of hair to change with the prevailing social standard; enforcement of the required length is a principle. Allowing an airman to seek redress through approved channels for what he feels are infringements of his rights is a flexibility; the prohibition against demonstrations in the military is a principle. The right of an airman to question the reasons for an order is a flexibility; the carrying out of that order is a principle. Flexibilities thus help the individual adjust to the principles of his military role by decreasing as many frustration-causing factors as possible.

Defining flexibilities will require careful consideration. Commanders must refrain from initiating innovations in a pell-mell fashion. For example, what appears as fair and equal treatment to a white airman might not be interpreted as such by a black airman whose environmental background has deprived him of the education needed to compete, or who has a marked inferiority complex because of his socioeconomic status. Selected, highly trained, and perceptive officers and airmen are needed in every military unit, to serve as a direct link between the men and their commander. In this way the root causes of frustration and tension can be identified, brought

to the attention of the commander, and corrected before they develop into confrontations and conflict. The morale improvement program of the Air Training Command is an outstanding example of this approach.[7]

In dealing with deviant behavior, however, the military must never bow to unjust demands either through appeasement or compromise. De Tocqueville warned against tyranny of the majority in America. Tyranny of the minority can be just as deadly. In identifying and defining principles and flexibilities, optimum balance must be maintained. In explaining this course to the American people, the military should avoid apologia.

If the military lacks the courage to stand against its critics when it believes itself right, or if it fails to pronounce judgment upon itself when it believes itself wrong, it will be guilty of moral agnosticism and deserving of the most acute public criticism and censure.

It seems inevitable, as Anthony Wermuth suggests, that "change will probably be endemic in the armed forces for the next decade, at least, as social change in American society gathers momentum."[8] The military can weather this change and successfully progress to an all-volunteer force if it remains true to its principles while bending with its flexibilities.

Washington, D.C.

Notes

1. Marcus Cunliffe, *Soldiers and Civilians: the Martial Spirit in America, 1775–1865* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), pp. 101–19.
2. Urpo Harva, "War and Human Nature" in *The Critique of War: Contemporary Philosophical Explorations*, ed. Robert Ginsberg (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1969), p. 45.
3. Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend, "Conflict, Crisis and Collision: A Study of International Stability," *Psychology Today*, May 1968, pp. 26–70.
4. Arthur Hadley, "The Soldiers: No One Cares Anymore," *Washington Post*, August 15, 1971, pp. B1–B3.
5. Major General Robert N. Ginsburgh, "Discipline and Dissent,"

an AFROTC commissioning address at North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina, 15 May 1971.
6. R. M. Hutchins, "The Nurture of Human Life," *Bulletin, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions of the Fund for the Republic*, No. 10, March 1961.
7. John G. Rogers, "Something New in the Air Force: Got a Gripe? Tell the General," *The Washington Post Parade*, August 29, 1971, pp. 18, 20.
8. Anthony L. Wermuth, *The Impact of Changing Values on Military Organization & Personnel*, ASG Monograph No. 6, December 1971 (Waltham, Massachusetts: Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 1952), p. 29.

Books and Ideas

THE TECHNOLOGICAL WAR

Colonel Francis X. Kane, USAF (Ret)

Technological leadership is essential for the U.S., given the nature of the Soviet society.
Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.

A SMALL, important, but unwelcome book has appeared in the literature of international affairs. *The Strategy of Technology,*† by Doctors Possony and Pournelle, is fittingly small because it deals with principles; it is important because it is destined to become one of the fundamental books for the future; it is unwelcome because it illuminates some of our most cherished self-delusions about war, strategy, and policy.

The book is controversial in another sense in that the authors engage in polemics on past programs. Critics of the book have focused on the polemics rather than the fundamentals. Hopefully, however, this book will contribute to forging new options for the future of the United States. One conclusion is clear: we have been committing a major strategic blunder in our current dismantling of our technological base, a blunder that ranks with the demobilization of our armed forces at the end of World War II. That past blunder could be overcome, though at the cost of much treasure, because we had time and a lead in technology.

---

† Stefan T. Possony and J. E. Pournelle, *The Strategy of Technology: Winning the Decisive War* (New York: The Dunellen Company, Inc., 1970, $7.50), xxxii and 189 pages.

Our current blunder could be a disaster for us and the Free World if it permits the Soviet Union to become technologically superior. In testimony in 1971 before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, stated:

> U.S. recovery from such a loss of technological leadership would not be feasible without enormous expenditures over many years—and without grave risk meanwhile of losing our national margin of safety.

Principles

The principles articulated by Possony and Pournelle are important because *The Strategy of Technology* asserts correctly that we are involved in a war—in fact, the decisive war: the technological war. Thus, the authors reason that success in the decisive war requires a deliberate strategy. Such a strategy must recognize that technology has a momentum all its own. In the sixties we saw an attempt in the U.S. to legislate technological change out of existence by postulating that we had reached a "technological plateau." The conclusion which was supposed to follow was that we did not need to invest time, talent, and treasure into modernizing our technology. Possony and Pournelle show that change in technology follows a "life pattern," deduced from experience and demonstrated to apply to the present. Their "S" curves of change illustrate that any "leveling off" is not only extremely short-lived but also the prelude to a new cycle of change. The "plateau" never was reached because of the continuing onrush of technology.

Such an attempt to legislate the end of change implied more than the denial of an impersonal momentum; it was based on the false assumption that the course of technology can be controlled unilaterally by the U.S. withdrawing from its mainstream. Understanding and applying the basic principles of mo-

mentum are essential to our national security.

The second principle is that the elements of technology are interdependent. Those elements are not national; they are international, even global, in extent and complexity. U.S. withdrawal from the supersonic transport element of technology resulted from a failure to understand this second principle. Development of the sst goes on in French/British and Russian programs. The qualitative changes that will result will not bear the imprint of the U.S. as they could and should.

The third principle is that technology and its impact are ubiquitous. We assumed that the space age ended when we put three astronauts on the moon. We had done what we set out to do; the rest of the world was supposed to follow our lead and thence ignore space. What happened is quite the opposite: our success has called attention of the rest of mankind to the potential of space. Consequently, over half the countries of the world now use satellites on a daily basis for communications and weather. Hundreds of ships use satellites for navigation continuously. Soon satellites will provide the means for direct broadcast to the whole Indian subcontinent and to all of Brazil. The resulting changes in their national education will be profound.

More important, the Soviets have continued an aggressive space program and have applied space technology to offense, defense, surveillance, communications, weather, navigation, and geodesy.

The final principle is that technology paces strategy; it leads strategy and determines its content and effectiveness. This principle is the most controversial one because it expresses what *is*, not what *ought* to be. Strategy should lead technology, but it has not and does not. Those who constrain our technology through measures such as reducing the space budget do not give us a better strategy; they reduce our strategy potential and constrain our strategy.

The whole point of *Strategy of Technology*

is to energize effort toward creating a national strategy that can and does lead technology. The second main theme of the work is that such a reversal of relationships and establishment of the proper ones require leadership.

Finding and exerting such leadership go counter to one of the schools of thought that make Possony and Pournelle's work unwelcome. As they correctly point out, the technological war is inseparably linked to the protracted conflict. Intuitive understanding of that interlinking runs counter to the self-delusion that protracted conflict does not exist. All our past efforts, including General Bernard Schriever's attempts to create a Technological War Plan and Project Forecast, came to naught because they were unwelcome to those theorists who postulated that U.S. initiatives produced Soviet reactions. In effect, they assumed that the U.S. influenced Soviet behavior. They refused to accept that the Soviets could be pursuing a strategy of technology. Rather than take the intelligent step of creating strategy to guide our dynamic technology, they constrained our technology.

Several important findings follow. We are still waiting for proof of the theorem of the sixties that the Soviets would slow down their technology if we slowed down ours. Events have proven those theorists to be wrong. We might ask why.

Furthermore, we have seen several Presidents attempt to find ways out of the strategic box in which they have been placed by those who constrained technology in the past. As the authors point out, the decisions the President makes on technology have impact two terms later. It follows that in order to cope with current circumstances we must take a view which is both broader and deeper.

Our strategy is confined to tactics—that is, the "realm of the possible." The key to a strategy adequate for security problems lies in a top-down approach to reversing the present situation. If we have a strategy, we can lead our technology in directions that enhance our security. An after-the-fact strategy is not adequate today and will not be tomorrow.

The technological war is the decisive war. It is also an alternative to destructive war, not a cause of "arms races." Our goal must be to win that war, not play by play, or game by game, but season after season, for it is a war that will not end unless we default or surrender.

Russian Strategy of Technology

That we *do not* have a strategy of technology is very clear. That the Russians *do* have a strategy of technology is equally clear. In his testimony of March 1971, Dr. Foster described the elements of that strategy and its importance.

First, the Soviets have purpose and continuity of purpose. Science and technology have been vital in their thinking since Lenin. They have used research and development to better their position. Their planning and allocation of resources have reflected long-term steadiness of purpose.

Second, they have followed consistent policies on technology. In order to challenge the U.S. technologically, the Soviets have implemented three main lines of policy. They have increased the number of technically qualified people available to them. The number of graduates in engineering and natural sciences grew from 145,000 in 1960 to 247,000 in 1970. Our estimate is that by 1976 the number will grow to 359,000 annually. (The corresponding numbers of graduates in the U.S. are 83,000; 142,000; and 181,000. The latter number for 1976 seems high considering the extent of the depression in the U.S. aerospace industry and the greatly reduced opportunities for employment in the coming years.)

The Soviets have steadily improved the quality and quantity of laboratory and engineering facilities available. They have a planned growth in the floor space of their

design bureaus and laboratories to accommodate the growing number of scientists and engineers.

They have steadily increased the amount of money devoted to research and development efforts. Beginning in the early 1950s, the Soviets started to increase steadily their investment in RDT&E. Through 1965 the average annual growth exceeded 10 percent. Since 1965 it has averaged 8 percent. However, in military RDT&E their growth rate since 1968 has been 15 percent per year. U.S. funding for military RDT&E in the same period has been constant. As a result, this year the Soviets will be devoting about 40 to 50 percent more in equivalent effort to military R&D than the U.S.

If the Soviets continue to implement their strategy of technology and we continue to constrain our efforts, the resulting trends will give us cause for concern. We could see several technological surprises; we could expect the Soviets to become technologically superior in military R&D in a few years.

In addition to purpose, continuity, and resource, the Soviet strategy of technology includes secrecy. Secrecy coupled with parity or superiority can give the Soviets a real and substantive advantage over the United States. Contrary to some U.S. theorists, the U.S. policy has been to wait for Soviet advances and then react to them. The so-called "action/ reaction cycle" applies to the U.S. nonstrategy of accommodating to Soviet initiative. But Soviet secrecy and superiority could make timely, effective U.S. reaction impossible.

We need look only briefly at the list of Soviet advances in recent years to understand the effectiveness of their strategy of technology:

They have passed us in numbers of ICBM's.

They are continuing the rate of SLBM deployment.

They are continuing to increase the number of satellites launched each year.

They have demonstrated the ability to "kill" satellites with nonnuclear devices.

They are creating a global navy and projecting their presence throughout the oceans of the world.

They are demonstrating formidable new techniques for air defense.

They are modernizing their aircraft.

They are equipping their land forces with advanced weapons.

Dr. Foster's finding that they can increase their civilian RDT&E and still reach military technological supremacy by the mid-seventies will not be accepted by those who complain about the high cost of military and space R&D. As Kosygin pointed out as long ago as 1965, expenditures for space are as helpful to the Soviet economy as any other expenditure. (He doubted that space expenditures were an undue burden in the U.S. either.)

In sum, the Soviet strategy of technology has changed the entire global strategic situation. One of the principal effects is, as Admiral Zumwalt stated before the House Committee on Appropriations, to decrease our military options in the event of a conflict of national interests.

Other Strategies of Technology

The Soviets have had spectacular success, but General de Gaulle also made significant advances by implementing his own strategy of technology. His purpose (unwelcome as it was within the NATO alliance) was to permit France to play an independent role. Independence applied to more than political decisions; for de Gaulle, it also meant that he could circumvent U.S. laws prohibiting collaboration in nuclear energy programs and develop his own missile and computer technology. By sustained effort he created an independent nuclear deterrent, the *force de frappe* (now called *force de dissuasion*). Presently, Mirage IV-A aircraft are being augmented by medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) in hardened silos and by sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).

Emerging countries also are attempting to develop their own strategies of technology. The Jackson Report of 1969 pointed out the need for better management of the programs of the Second Development Decade for the industrial, educational, and economic advances of these ninety nations.

We have little insight into the R&D of Red China, but it seems clear that they appreciate several fundamentals: Possessing nuclear weapons, missiles, and satellites does not make a nation a great power, but having them is essential to becoming a great power. Consequently, Red China is creating them.

Finally, we have yet to see what Japan will do in advanced R&D. Japan, however, is a space power and is increasing its defense budget significantly.

Options for the U.S.

Possony and Pournelle have catalogued the assumptions governing our strategy and challenged some of our most persistent fallacies. One of these fallacies regards science as a substitute for military judgment; another so regards systems analysis. In the past we used management as a substitute for strategy and assumed that the more centralized the management was the more responsive and effective the strategy would be. However, their dissection of errors, delusions, and fallacies is a prelude to their positive steps for improvement.

Their emphasis is on creative leaders who capitalize on the technological process and make judgments in keeping with the reality of that process. To assist these leaders, we need strategic analysis that integrates technology, the military arts, and nonmilitary conflict. This function of strategic analysis is the final decision in the process of selecting the systems to be acquired.

In his testimony of March 1971 Dr. Foster stated that we could expect some technological surprises from the Soviet Union. *The Strategy of Technology* deals with surprise in modern war in some detail. Coping with surprise and capitalizing on our own technical advances as surprises are vital to the purpose of the technological war. As already mentioned, Possony and Pournelle consider technological war the alternative to active hostilities; its goal should be the negation of war. And the key to surprise is initiative.

Assured Survival

In identifying U.S. options for the future, the authors describe a strategy of "assured survival." They propose a complex of offensive and defensive forces. Their complex of weapon systems would give us many capabilities to negate the Soviets' potential technological advances in the systems they are developing. Such a range of U.S. capabilities would continue to create uncertainty in the minds of the Soviets about the outcome of any war they might initiate. Uncertainty is the key to deterrence. War, including and especially technological war, is an operation primarily against the will of the opponent.

Those operations aim at providing security, but security cannot be guaranteed by passive measures, nor by agreements that try to halt the stream of technology. The way to guarantee security is to win in the technological war. Winning can come from a strategy of technology.

Some Troublesome Issues

Possony and Pournelle have articulated the principles of the decisive war of technology and have illuminated some of the fundamentals we must address to insure our continuing security. They do not address some issues that may make it impossible to effect a viable solution for us. Those issues lie outside the realm of military and security policy; they lie in our national character as well as in our philosophy. We can rid ourselves of our self-delusions, but can we create a new

philosophy to guide our strategy and thus our security? French General André Beaufre, in his works on deterrence, has stressed the need for a unifying philosophy, but few have recognized the wisdom of his finding and nothing is being done to overcome this basic deficiency.

A great nation can cease to be great either through defeat by its enemies or because its people decline the burdens of leadership that are inherent in being great. In reality, defeat results from attempting to withdraw from greatness. There are many indicators that the U.S. wants to stop being a superpower. The current demobilization of our technology is one of the dominant indicators. But if we are going to lay down our mantle of leadership, let us do so as a rational, conscious decision, not an emotional response to the burdens of the protracted conflict in the technological war.

In *The Strategy of Technology*, Possony and Pournelle have shown how we must act to win the decisive war, the technological war. By implication, they have shown that we are pursuing a course toward defeat—unknowingly.

Los Angeles, California

The Contributors

DR. CURTIS W. TARR (Ph.D., Stanford University), until his recent appointment as Under Secretary of State for Coordinating Security Assistant Programs, served as Director of the Selective Service System. He was Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) in 1969–70. After combat service in the U.S. Army, European Theater, he earned degrees and filled teaching and dean assignments at Stanford and Harvard. Dr. Tarr was President of Lawrence University, 1963–69, and served as Chairman, Task Force on Local Government Finance and Organization, State of Wisconsin.

BRIGADIER GENERAL DANIEL JAMES, JR. (B.S., Tuskegee Institute) is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). Commissioned in 1943, he served with fighter units and in the Korean War flew 101 combat missions. Other assignments include Commander, 60th Fighter Interceptor Squadron; Deputy Commander/Operations, 81st Fighter Wing, England; DC/O, 4453d Combat Training Wing; Vice Commander, 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, Thailand; and Commander, 7272d Flying Training Wing, Libya. He is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and has been nominated and confirmed for promotion to major general.

MAJOR GENERAL EDWARD G. LANSDALE, USAF (Ret), served in the Army of the U.S., 1943–47, and then in the USAF until his retirement in 1963. He served as special assistant to Ambassador Lodge in South Vietnam and as U.S. representative on the Vietnamese government commission to win support of the countryside. He also served as assistant for special operations to the Secretary of Defense. General Lansdale has published articles in magazines and a recent book, *In the Midst of Wars*, his memoirs of the Philippine Huk campaign and Diem's early leadership in Vietnam.

DR. RALPH E. STRAUCH (Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley) is a mathematician with the Washington Research Department of The RAND Corporation. He served with the U.S. Navy as a communications officer from 1959 to 1962 and has been a member of the RAND staff since 1965. His areas of research have included mathematics, operations research, weapon systems analysis, and strategic forces and policy. His articles have appeared in technical journals and as RAND Corporation publications.


COLONEL ROBERT L. GLEASON (M.P.A., Auburn University) is Chief, Corona

Harvest Project Office, Air University. A graduate and former faculty member of Air War College, he was part of the original Jungle Jim organization and remained in special warfare operations, including tours in Vietnam and Latin America. Colonel Gleason was assigned to the Air Staff 1965–68, when he became Deputy Chief, MACSOG, Vietnam.

MAJOR MICHAEL A. NELSON (M.A., University of Arizona) is a student in the Air Command and Staff College. His previous experience has centered primarily in tactical fighters, including a combat tour in the F-105. On returning from SEA, Major Nelson attended graduate school under the AFIT program and specialized in Latin American politics. Subsequently he was assigned as an adviser to the Republic of Korea Air Force.

MAJOR JAMES S. AUSTIN, JR. (M.A., Saint Mary's University of San Antonio) is Manager, Special Programs Division, Civilian Institutions Directorate, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. From 1961 to 1969 he held assignments in OSI district offices in San Antonio and Republic of Vietnam and as instructor, USAF Special Investigations School, Washington, D.C. In 1966–67 he was Assistant Professor of Aerospace Studies, University of California, Berkeley.

MAJOR JIMMY L. MITCHELL (M.A., Ohio State University) is a test psychologist, Det 17, ATC, Lackland AFB, Texas, following duty in Civilian Institutions Directorate, AFIT, as Arts and Social Science Program Manager and Executive Officer, 1966–71. Commissioned from OTS in 1960 after two years as psychiatric clinic technician, USAF Hospital, Wright-Patterson AFB, he served as police or combat defense officer state-side and in Morocco until selection for AFIT at Ohio State. Major Mitchell is a graduate of Squadron Officer School.

COLONEL WILLIAM R. EDGAR (M.B.A., Harvard University) is Commander, 4500th Air Base Wing, Langley AFB, Virginia. During World War II he was a pilot and light bombardment instructor. He has served as NATO Operations Staff Officer; in Personnel Retention Division and Selection Board Secretariat, DCS/P, Hq USAF; in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force as Liaison Officer to the House of Representatives; and as Director of Information, Tactical Air Command. He is a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUSSELL A. TURNER II (M.A., American University) is Chief of the Air Force Art Program, Secretary of the Air Force Office of Information. A former B-29, C-121, and C-130 pilot, he has been an information officer with Air Force Systems Command and with NATO forces in Iceland. Colonel Turner, a graduate of Squadron Officer School, USAF Communication Course at Boston University, and Armed Forces Staff College, was once a commercial and free-lance artist and has two paintings in the Air Force art collection.

COLONEL FRANCIS X. KANE, USAF (Ret), (USMA; Ph.D., Georgetown University) served 27 years in war planning, systems analysis, space and missile planning, and overseas as assistant air attaché, Paris, and with the 508th Fighter Group. He is still actively engaged in strategy analysis and long-range space and missile planning. He has taught at Catholic University, Pepperdine College, and the University of California at Los Angeles. His writings have appeared in *Fortune*, *Orbis*, *Air University Review*, *Missiles and Rockets*, *Air Force and Space Digest*, and *Air Power Historian*.

AWARD

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "Antimilitarism in America" by Herman S. Wolk as the outstanding article in the May-June 1972 issue of the *Review*.

UNITED
STATES
AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY
REVIEW